NCIRCULAR

South Sudan’s first election won’t be perfect – but another delay could be even riskier

2026-08-03T10:00:00+00:00

South Sudan is expected to hold an election on 22 December 2026, the first in the country’s history. It’s already been postponed twice, in 2022 and 2024.

A great deal is being said and written about whether or not there should be an election. But, having researched South Sudan’s post-war transition since the revitalised peace agreement was signed in 2018, I would argue that the real question is whether another extension would create the political conditions that previous delays failed to deliver.

South Sudan’s first national elections will almost certainly be imperfect. Few countries emerging from violent conflict hold flawless elections.

But another transition extension is even less likely to resolve the country’s underlying political problems. These include elite power struggles, weak institutions and unresolved security arrangements.

In my view, the transition has reached its limits. What’s needed to move ahead is a succession plan. Naming a running mate for President Salva Kiir could facilitate a political succession that would be less disruptive than an unplanned and sudden succession in the event that the transition gets prolonged again.

Unpreparedness is real

The National Election Commission announced the poll date six months in advance, as required by law. But neither the state of preparations nor the available funding made this look realistic.

Critics have warned that the country isn’t ready. Institutions remain weak. Insecurity persists across parts of the country and civic education is lacking. Cornerstones of the 2018 peace agreement – such as a permanent constitution and a joint army that integrates the armed opposition forces – aren’t in place.

The first vice-president – and potential presidential contender – Riek Machar remains detained and on trial for his role in armed fighting in Nasir, Upper Nile State, in March 2025.

Preparations are also falling behind. The current election law is flawed – for instance, it mistakenly provides for 105% of the seats in the national assembly – and voter registration hasn’t started.

The election commission has also decided to reuse the constituencies from Sudan’s 2010 elections. This has prompted legal objections that these boundaries don’t reflect reality in an independent South Sudan.

Unfinished business

The signing of the peace agreement in 2018 established a fragile power-sharing arrangement. It brought the country’s warring parties into a transitional government of national unity. General elections were intended to conclude the transition period.

Each extension was justified by the promise that additional time would allow completion of the key transitional tasks. That never happened. There is little reason to believe that another two or three years would produce a different outcome.

The biggest gaps in South Sudan at the moment are these:

Constitution-making remains politically contested. South Sudan still operates under a transitional constitution from 2011. It largely reflects arrangements inherited from the pre-independence period. A permanent constitution is expected to define matters like the distribution of political power, the relationship between national and state authorities, the role of customary law, and how the country’s diversity is represented in the political system.
Security sector reform has made only limited progress. A central provision of the peace agreement is the integration of government forces, the opposition and other armed groups into a unified military force. The aim is to reduce the risk of renewed conflict.
Transitional justice processes haven’t started. These mechanisms are intended to investigate crimes committed during South Sudan’s civil war, and provide accountability and reconciliation. Senior political and military figures responsible for implementing these provisions could themselves become subjects of investigation. If indicted by the courts, they would be barred from holding public office. There has, therefore, been little political appetite to establish the processes.

The transition has turned into the main obstacle for these tasks to be completed. An election would make it possible to get on with the tasks by giving someone the authority.

The existing gaps have left the door open to unhelpful developments. The worst is the reproduction of kleptocratic and authoritarian structures.

The case for an election

One of South Sudan’s biggest challenges could be resolved by an election: the question of political succession in the executive.

The question looms large over South Sudan. Whether elections are held or postponed, it’s likely to be a source of political disruption.

Kiir has dominated South(ern) Sudanese politics for more than 20 years. Who could succeed him if he were no longer able to continue?

The transitional framework offers remarkably little certainty on this. Formally, the ruling party would need to name a successor. Nobody has been earmarked. Were succession to become an immediate political issue, the most likely consequence would be violent infighting within the ruling party.

Elections offer something that another extension cannot. They can force the ruling party – which, according to available political perception data, has a good chance to win both presidential and parliamentary elections even without rigging – to clarify the succession issue.

A presidential election would require the governing party to nominate a presidential candidate and a vice-presidential candidate endorsed by Kiir and party organs. Whoever occupies the vice-president position would be the leading and legitimised candidate to succeed should the presidency unexpectedly become vacant.

This does not eliminate political competition. It provides a far clearer and more legitimate succession pathway than the current transitional arrangements.

Those arguing against a poll being held point to the dangers of electoral violence. Election-related violence is a genuine risk. But postponing elections doesn’t necessarily reduce such risk.

Extending the transition again would instead deepen political uncertainty.

Perhaps the strongest argument for elections, however, comes from South Sudanese citizens themselves.

Nationwide survey research shows that around four in five South Sudanese support holding elections, even though most also recognise that violence remains a serious possibility.

This finding deserves greater attention than it usually receives. If most South Sudanese want elections, on what basis should political elites or international partners argue that they should wait?

What needs to be done

None of this means that elections can simply proceed. The financial, legal and practical preparation challenges are severe and will not be resolved overnight. An inter-party dialogue preparing the political ground for elections is a useful initiative. But this is unlikely to resolve the tensions with the main opposition forces behind Machar.

Recent suggestions by international partners like the European Union to discuss a short technical extension – for instance to March or April 2027 – or to hold executive and legislative elections separately are reasonable. But an indefinite postponement won’t lead the country anywhere.

Jan Pospisil, Researcher at the Austrian Institute for International Affairs

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Blaming migrants ignores the real causes of South Africa’s economic crisis

2026-07-01T10:00:00+00:00

Image: Wikimedia Commons (Public Domain)

Justin Visagie, University of the Witwatersrand and Ruth Castel-Branco, University of the Witwatersrand

South Africa is in the midst of its most significant anti-immigrant mobilisation in years.

The emergence of the March and March movement, calls for the mass deportation of undocumented migrants by 30 June 2026, growing anti-immigrant violence, and the repatriation of foreign nationals by several African governments have pushed immigration to the centre of national debate.

The anti-immigrant protest movement argues that it is responding to rising unemployment, deteriorating public services and growing insecurity.

The question is not whether these grievances have merit. They do. It’s whether immigrants are, in fact, responsible for them.

This article draws from research by the Southern Centre for Inequality Studies at the University of the Witwatersrand. It examines the drivers and consequences of inequality. It focuses on the world of work, public spending, production and ownership, technological change and innovation, and the effects of climate change.

Our research provides important context for understanding the economic and social conditions in which anti-migrant sentiment has exploded – and its underlying causes. Immigration is not irrelevant to the multiple and overlapping crises facing South Africans. But it’s not their primary cause.

Joblessness and informality

Few issues illustrate this more clearly than employment.

South Africa has one of the highest unemployment rates in the world. More than four in every ten working-age adults who want work are unable to find it (this includes discouraged work seekers). The scale of this crisis understandably creates pressure to identify a cause and demand action.

Many South Africans have concluded that immigrants are taking jobs away from local workers. Our analysis of public opinion data shows that as many as 70% of South Africans believe that immigrants take jobs from people born in the country.

These views help explain the growing support for anti-immigrant mobilisation. But public perceptions do not always align with reality.

Administrative tax data suggests that foreign nationals occupy a very small share of formal employment in South Africa. Our researchers have found that less than 4% of formal jobs are held by foreigners. This share has remained largely unchanged for more than a decade.

The picture is somewhat different in the informal economy, where foreign-born workers represent a limited but larger 20% share of participants.

Related research by Southern Centre for Inequality Studies scholars together with the international informal workers’ organisation StreetNet and Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing (WIEGO) in South Africa found that as the informal sector expands amid rising unemployment, competition has increased. This has made livelihoods more precarious and earnings more difficult to sustain.

Competition is particularly rife among spaza shop owners (informal neighbourhood grocery stores) and street traders, who purchase goods in the formal sector and resell them at a small profit margin. Foreign-owned spaza stores tend to run larger and collective operations – a similar role to wholesalers. This enables them to offer a wider range of products for lower prices.

Creating a supportive environment for informal operators would require policy shifts. They could include: access to start-up capital, wholesale sourcing of goods, secure access to public space, investment in affordable public infrastructure and services, and reduced harassment by municipal authorities.

Despite recent government plans to revitalise the township (historically segregated poor neighbourhoods) and rural economies, South Africa’s economic policy remains focused on the formal sector.

The frustrations experienced by South Africans are therefore understandable. But South Africa’s unemployment crisis is simply too large to be explained by immigration alone.

For example, our research suggests that the unemployment rate would fall by only six percentage points – from 43.6% to 37.6% – if all foreigners’ jobs were somehow handed to unemployed South Africans.

This is a relatively modest reduction given the scale of South Africa’s unemployment crisis. It highlights that foreigners do not dominate the labour market overall, even if some sectors and locations have higher concentrations of immigrant workers.

Yet, not only is it unrealistic to expect that jobs could be swapped one-to-one between immigrants and South Africans. It could even result in net overall job losses for South Africans because of the reduction in entrepreneurship, investment and skills which foreigners bring.

This was the conclusion of a World Bank report which found that one immigrant worker actually generates approximately two jobs for locals.

The economic contribution of migrants may also help explain why attitudes towards immigration vary across South Africa. A Southern Centre for Inequality Studies scholar found that residents of more deprived municipalities were sometimes more supportive of cross-border movement than those living in better-resourced areas. One possible explanation is that direct contact with migrants helped challenge stereotypes and helped make their economic contributions more visible.

If immigration is not the primary cause of joblessness, why does the perception resonate so strongly?

Part of the answer lies in the economic pressures experienced by ordinary households.

Economic pressures facing households

Households face rising costs associated with food, transport, electricity and other essentials. These pressures come on top of the deterioration of public services. Power outages, unreliable public transport, overcrowded schools, and long waits at public clinics have become part of everyday life for many South Africans. This has reinforced a sense that living standards are steadily declining.

Our research confirms that the reduction in government borrowing, mainly through reduced budgets and the collection of more revenue, has been squeezing out public services for a decade. This has contributed to worsening teacher-learner ratios, longer waiting periods at public health facilities, and increasing backlogs at courts.

These pressures are likely to intensify in the years ahead for a number of reasons.

First, climate change places disproportionate burdens on vulnerable groups, such as women, particularly through its effects on care work, livelihoods and access to essential resources.

Our recent research also suggests that the green transition will create highly uneven labour market impacts across South Africa. Some communities will bear significant job losses and economic disruption that could intensify social and political tensions.

Second, the limits of South Africa’s social protection are becoming more apparent. Social grants have become a lifeline for millions of households and play a vital role in preventing destitution. But they cannot substitute for decent work and economic opportunity. Our research on social protection shows people want something more than survival. They want meaningful work, dignity, independence and opportunities to build better lives.

The challenge facing South Africa is not simply to reduce poverty, but to expand opportunity. South Africa’s economic prosperity is actually tied to trade and investment with the rest of Africa. Anti-immigrant politics may deliver short-term political gains. But they risk damaging the relationships and openness on which South Africa’s long-term growth depends.

A warning signal

The rise of anti-immigrant sentiment is a warning signal. It reflects genuine frustration with economic conditions and declining opportunities faced by the average South African. Ignoring those frustrations would be a mistake.

But so too would be blaming migrants for a crisis they did not create. Economic hardship may help explain anti-immigrant sentiment, but it cannot justify directing hostility or violence towards people whose rights and dignity deserve equal protection.

South Africa’s challenges demand better policy, not scapegoating, prejudice or violence against migrants.

The statement on which this article is based was signed by the following Southern Centre for Inequality Studies research staff: Comfort Molefinyana, David Francis, Geci Karuri-Sebina, Glen Robbins, Gontse Mabaso, Imraan Valodia, Julia Taylor, Khanimamba Masuluke, Khumisho Moguerane, Niall Reddy, Nirvana Pillay, Nishal Robb, Rahul Gandhi, Rashaad Mohamed Amra, Rheyna Pattni, Rozeena Das, Ujithra Ponniah.

Justin Visagie, Associate Professor at the Southern Centre for Inequality Studies, University of the Witwatersrand and Ruth Castel-Branco, Senior lecturer, University of the Witwatersrand

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Nigeria’s Economic Outlook for 2026: From Stabilization to Gradual, Inclusive Growth

2026-01-19T10:00:00+00:00

Published: January 19, 2026 | N-Circular Economic Analysis

As Nigeria embarks on 2026, the nation's economic landscape presents a picture of cautious optimism tempered by persistent structural challenges. Following President Bola Ahmed Tinubu's administration's ambitious reform agenda implemented throughout 2025, the economy is demonstrating tangible signs of stabilization. Real GDP grew 3.98% y/y in Q3 2025 (National Bureau of Statistics), headline inflation has eased to 14.45% in November 2025 under the rebased CPI, and the naira consolidated gains at the official window in early January 2026. External reserves closed 2025 around $45.5 billion, providing a robust buffer against shocks.

Yet beneath these encouraging headline figures lie complex realities: rising poverty rates affecting nearly two-thirds of Nigerians, oil sector vulnerabilities with production often falling short of targets, and security concerns that threaten to undermine progress. This comprehensive analysis synthesizes insights from leading financial institutions including PwC Nigeria, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), Fitch Ratings, and CardinalStone Partners, alongside government policy documents and real-time data from Nigeria's economic indicators.

Macroeconomic Baselines (End-2025 / Early-2026)

Growth Trajectory and Sectoral Performance

The Nigerian economy is projected to expand by 4.2–4.5% in 2026, representing a modest acceleration from 2025's third-quarter growth rate of 3.98%. The National Bureau of Statistics reports that services led output at 53.02% of GDP in Q3 2025, with agriculture contributing 31.21% and industry 15.77%. Oil production averaged 1.64 million barrels per day (mbpd) in Q3, lifting oil-sector growth to 5.84% y/y.

Major Institutional Forecasts for 2026:

PwC Nigeria: 4.3–4.49%
Central Bank of Nigeria: 4.49%
International Monetary Fund: 4.2%
Fitch Ratings: 4.3%

The anticipated expansion will be predominantly driven by non-oil sectors, which have increasingly become the backbone of Nigerian economic activity. Services, telecommunications, financial services, construction, and trade are expected to lead growth, reflecting the ongoing structural transformation of the economy.

GDP by Sector – Q3 2025

Data shows Services dominating at 53.02%, Agriculture at 31.21%, and Industry at 15.77%. Source: NBS GDP Q3 2025

Agriculture, traditionally a major employer and GDP contributor, faces a more uncertain outlook. Persistent security challenges in key farming regions—particularly in the Middle Belt and parts of the North—continue to disrupt production cycles and supply chains, potentially limiting the sector's contribution to overall growth.

Inflation: The Long Road to Price Stability

Perhaps the most visible success of recent policy interventions has been the dramatic reduction in inflation. After years of accelerating price pressures, inflation fell to 14.45% in November 2025—the lowest reading since 2020. Food inflation was recorded at 11.08% amid improved harvests and FX stability. For 2026, the CBN's Economic Outlook projects average headline inflation around 12.94%, representing further moderation.

Headline Inflation (YoY) – Sep-Nov 2025

Inflation trajectory shows: Sep 2025 at 18.02%, Oct at 16.05%, Nov at 14.45%. Sources: CBN, NBS

Several factors underpin this optimistic inflation outlook:

Exchange Rate Stabilization: The naira has found relative equilibrium, trading broadly in the ₦1,420–₦1,450/$ band at the official window in early January 2026, with the parallel spread narrower than mid-2025 as reforms deepened liquidity. This stability has reduced imported inflation that had previously cascaded through the economy.

Food Price Dynamics: Improved harvest seasons, combined with reduced transportation costs following petrol subsidy reforms, are expected to ease food inflation, which comprises a significant portion of the consumer price basket for most Nigerian households.

Monetary Policy Credibility: The CBN's demonstrated commitment to price stability, even at the cost of maintaining relatively tight monetary conditions, has helped anchor inflation expectations among businesses and consumers.

However, risks remain. Pre-election spending ahead of the 2027 general elections could fuel demand-side pressures, while any resurgence in exchange rate volatility or oil price shocks could quickly reverse recent gains.

Exchange Rate Dynamics

The naira traded broadly in the ₦1,420–₦1,450/$ band at the official window in early January 2026. Sample prints show: January 2 at ₦1,446.62/$, January 7 at ₦1,419/$, and January 10 at ₦1,423.17/$. Parallel market rates showed: January 7 at ₦1,464/$, with mid-range prints of ₦1,480–₦1,505/$ on January 9, and approximately ₦1,465/$ on January 10.

The CBN's revised foreign exchange management approach, including greater market determination of rates, has helped eliminate much of the parallel market premium that previously distorted prices.

Naira/USD – Official vs. Parallel (Selected Prints, January 2026)

Chart shows official and parallel market rates converging, with official rates strengthening from ₦1,446 to ₦1,419-₦1,423 range, while parallel market rates hover around ₦1,464-₦1,505. Sources: Multiple market data providers

External Sector: A Surprising Bright Spot

One of the more remarkable turnarounds has occurred in Nigeria's external accounts. External reserves ended 2025 around $45.49 billion, ticking up to approximately $45.6 billion in early January 2026 amid stronger FX inflows and CBN operations. The CBN projects $51.04 billion by end-2026.

External Reserves – Nov 2025 to Jan 2026

Reserves trajectory: Nov 2025 at $44.67bn, Dec at $45.45bn, Jan 7, 2026 at $45.66bn. Sources: CBN, TradingEconomics

CardinalStone Partners projects a current account surplus of $17.7 billion in 2026, representing approximately 4.9% of GDP—a dramatic reversal from the deficits that characterized much of the previous decade. This improvement reflects:

Increased export earnings from both oil and non-oil sectors, including refined-product exports
Reduced import pressures due to naira depreciation and economic adjustments
Growing remittances from the Nigerian diaspora
Improved foreign direct investment (FDI) flows, which reached $720 million in Q3 2025 alone

This reserve accumulation represents not just a quantitative improvement, but a qualitative shift in Nigeria's external resilience and capacity to weather global economic shocks.

2026 Policy Framework & Budget Signals

Presidential Vision and Budget Priorities

In his 2026 New Year address, President Tinubu highlighted the administration's economic achievements in 2025, framing them as vindication of difficult but necessary reforms. The commemorated milestones included:

GDP growth exceeding 4% for the first time in several years
Inflation falling below 15%
A 48% rally in the Nigerian Stock Exchange, signaling renewed investor confidence
Significant improvements in foreign direct investment

Appropriation and Fiscal Benchmarks

The President presented a ₦58.46 trillion 2026 Appropriation Bill on December 19, 2025, with a $64.85/barrel oil price benchmark and 1.84 mbpd production assumption. The Senate later endorsed a ₦54.46 trillion framework and lowered the oil benchmark to $60/barrel while retaining production assumptions.

The 2026 federal budget, themed "Restoration: Securing Peace, Rebuilding Prosperity," prioritizes:

Infrastructure spending to address Nigeria's estimated $3 trillion infrastructure deficit
Social investment programs aimed at cushioning the impact of reforms on vulnerable populations
Security funding to address the insurgencies and criminal activities hampering economic activity
Debt servicing, which continues to consume a significant portion of revenue

CBN Economic Guidance

The CBN 2026 Economic Outlook pencils headline inflation at approximately 12.94% and real GDP growth around 4.49%, conditional on FX/energy stability and reform execution. The central bank also guides toward larger current account surpluses and continued reserve accumulation.

Oil Sector: Progress with Persistent Caveats

Production Realities and Challenges

While the 2026 budget assumes production of 1.84 mbpd, actual performance in 2025 tells a more sobering story. NUPRC and OPEC data show 2025 crude output averaging approximately 1.46–1.50 mbpd (crude), or 1.6–1.66 mbpd including condensates—below the Federal Government's 2025 benchmark and often under the 1.5 mbpd OPEC quota, despite occasional months meeting quota.

The oil sector, while showing signs of gradual recovery, continues to face headwinds from global oversupply, accumulated crude inventories, security challenges affecting production infrastructure, and underinvestment in upstream operations.

Refining and Downstream Developments

The Dangote Refinery represents a transformative development for Nigeria's downstream sector. The facility entered planned maintenance on select units in December 2025 but reaffirmed ongoing supply, indicating 40–50 million litres/day of PMS in January-February 2026, with diesel and jet fuel continuing via other units. Industry coverage notes a short crude distillation unit (CDU) turnaround intended to lift capacity and stabilize the residual fluid catalytic cracking (RFCC) unit.

This development, once fully operational, is expected to significantly reduce Nigeria's refined petroleum product import bill and improve energy security—both critical factors for economic stability and growth.

The 2026 Tax Reforms: A Comprehensive Fiscal Revolution

The Legislative Framework

The centerpiece of Nigeria's economic policy architecture for 2026 is undoubtedly the comprehensive tax reform package that took effect on January 1st. This represents the most significant overhaul of Nigeria's tax system in decades—perhaps since independence. Four landmark pieces of legislation, signed into law in June 2025 after extensive stakeholder consultations, comprise this reform:

1. Nigeria Tax Act 2025: The primary legislation consolidating substantive tax provisions across multiple tax types.

2. Nigeria Tax Administration Act 2025: Establishes modernized procedures for tax assessment, collection, dispute resolution, and enforcement.

3. Nigeria Revenue Service (Establishment) Act 2025: Transforms the Federal Inland Revenue Service into the Nigeria Revenue Service, with enhanced powers, digital capabilities, and a broader mandate.

4. Joint Revenue Board (Establishment) Act 2025: Creates coordination mechanisms between federal and state revenue authorities to eliminate double taxation and improve compliance.

Together, these laws consolidate over 70 previously fragmented taxes, levies, and fees into a streamlined, progressive system. The stated objectives are ambitious but clear:

Broaden the tax base by bringing more economic activities into the formal system
Increase the tax-to-GDP ratio from its current ~10% toward the government's 18% target
Reduce compliance costs for businesses and individuals
Implement a more equitable distribution of tax burdens
Deploy technology and data analytics to improve collection efficiency

Personal Income Tax: Relief for the Masses

The most immediately impactful change for ordinary Nigerians is the radical restructuring of personal income tax:

Income Tax-Free Threshold: Annual income up to ₦800,000 (approximately $550 at current exchange rates) is now completely exempt from income tax. This threshold was carefully calibrated to ensure that most low-income workers and minimum wage earners pay no income tax whatsoever. For context, Nigeria's minimum wage is ₦70,000 monthly, translating to ₦840,000 annually—meaning even minimum wage earners receive substantial relief.

Progressive Rate Structure: Beyond the tax-free threshold, a new progressive rate structure applies:

₦800,001 to ₦3,000,000: 15%
₦3,000,001 to ₦10,000,000: 18%
₦10,000,001 to ₦20,000,000: 21%
Above ₦20,000,000: 25%

This structure ensures that the tax burden increases gradually as income rises, implementing a more equitable system where higher earners contribute proportionally more.

Elimination of Nuisance Taxes: Multiple small levies that previously plagued low-income workers—including the radio and television license fee, bicycle and cart licenses, and various informal sector levies—have been abolished entirely. These "nuisance taxes" were costly to collect, yielded minimal revenue, and created harassment opportunities.

The reforms also standardize personal relief allowances, introduce tax credits for pension contributions and life insurance premiums, and simplify filing requirements for individual taxpayers.

Corporate Taxation: Simplification Meets Modernization

Corporate Income Tax Rationalization: The standard corporate income tax rate is harmonized at 25% for large companies (turnover above ₦25 million), with reduced rates for small and medium enterprises:

Small companies (turnover ₦0–₦25 million): 0%
Medium companies (turnover ₦25–₦100 million): 20%
Large companies (turnover above ₦100 million): 25%

This tiered approach aims to support SME growth while maintaining competitiveness with regional peers.

Abolition of Multiple Taxes: Companies previously navigated a bewildering maze of overlapping taxes. The reforms eliminate or consolidate numerous levies including the Education Tax (replaced by a skills development levy), multiple state and local government taxes that effectively constituted double taxation, and various sector-specific levies.

Incentives for Priority Sectors: Generous tax holidays and incentives are preserved for investments in infrastructure, solid minerals, manufacturing, agriculture, and renewable energy. However, these incentives are now time-bound with clear sunset provisions and performance conditions.

Transfer Pricing and International Standards: Nigeria now fully aligns with OECD Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) guidelines, including Country-by-Country reporting for multinational enterprises. This modernization aims to curb profit shifting while providing clarity for legitimate international businesses.

Capital Allowances: The reforms introduce accelerated capital allowances for investments in plant, machinery, and technology, encouraging productive investment over mere financial engineering.

Value Added Tax: Broadening the Base

Rate Structure: VAT remains at 7.5% standard rate, with:

0% rate for essential goods (basic foods, medicines, educational materials)
Exemptions for certain services (health, education, financial services)
Full VAT on luxury goods and services

Administration Improvements: The reforms digitize VAT collection and remittance, with electronic invoicing becoming mandatory for VAT-registered businesses above certain thresholds. This digital infrastructure aims to reduce leakage and improve compliance while lowering the burden on compliant taxpayers.

Revenue Sharing Formula: A contentious political issue, the VAT revenue allocation formula has been adjusted to give greater weight to derivation (where consumption occurs) while maintaining solidarity elements. This change favors economically vibrant states but includes safeguards for less developed regions.

Special Regimes and Sector-Specific Provisions

Petroleum Profits Tax: The reforms maintain the existing Petroleum Profits Tax regime but introduce clearer transfer pricing rules and thin capitalization provisions specific to the oil and gas sector.

Capital Gains Tax: Previously sporadic and inconsistently applied, CGT is now comprehensive but with exemptions for:

Disposal of Nigerian government securities
Shares traded on the Nigerian Stock Exchange (subject to conditions)
Principal private residences
Agricultural land

The rate structure is progressive, ranging from 10% to 15% depending on the nature and holding period of the asset.

Stamp Duties: Electronic stamping for all instruments subject to stamp duty is now mandatory, eliminating the physical stamp regime. Rates are standardized and reduced for many transaction types, particularly affecting banking and finance.

Withholding Tax: The multitude of WHT provisions across various laws has been consolidated. Key changes include standardization of rates, introduction of a withholding tax credit system to prevent cascading, and expansion of final withholding tax provisions for small businesses and individuals.

Implementation and Compliance Architecture

Digital Infrastructure: The Nigeria Revenue Service is rolling out a comprehensive digital tax system including:

Taxpayer portal for registration, filing, and payment
Automated risk assessment and audit selection
Electronic invoicing for VAT
Real-time data integration with banks, mobile money operators, and other third parties

Taxpayer Services: Recognizing that voluntary compliance requires good service, the reforms mandate service standards including maximum processing times for refunds, dedicated SME support units, and alternative dispute resolution mechanisms to reduce litigation.

Penalties and Enforcement: While the reforms aim to make compliance easier, they simultaneously toughen penalties for non-compliance and introduce beneficial ownership disclosure requirements to combat tax evasion.

Critical Risk Factors and Challenges

Oil Price and Production Vulnerabilities

The budget's assumption of $60/barrel oil price (Senate benchmark) faces significant downside risks. Global oil markets in early 2026 are characterized by:

Substantial crude inventory overhangs
OPEC+ production discipline challenges
Accelerating global energy transition reducing long-term demand
Geopolitical uncertainties that could swing prices in either direction

More critically, Nigeria's ability to reach the 1.84 mbpd production target remains highly uncertain given the actual 2025 average of 1.46–1.50 mbpd. Shortfalls in either price or production would directly impact government revenues and external sector balances.

Security Challenges

Nigeria continues to grapple with multiple security threats across different regions:

Northeast: Boko Haram and ISWAP insurgencies, though weakened, remain active
Northwest: Banditry, kidnapping, and cattle rustling disrupt agriculture and commerce
Southeast: Separatist agitations and criminal violence
Middle Belt: Farmer-herder conflicts over land and resources
South-South: Oil theft and pipeline vandalism

These security challenges directly constrain economic activity by disrupting farming, deterring investment, damaging infrastructure, and diverting public resources from productive uses to security expenditure.

Implementation Capacity

Even excellent policies fail without effective implementation. Nigeria's public sector faces capacity constraints at all levels:

Human capital: Shortages of skilled personnel in key agencies
Digital infrastructure: While improving, still faces reliability issues
Coordination: Federal, state, and local government coordination remains challenging
Corruption: Despite progress, corruption continues to undermine policy effectiveness

The tax reforms, in particular, depend heavily on administrative capacity, technological infrastructure, and voluntary compliance—all of which require sustained investment and institution-building.

Social Pressures and Political Economy

With nearly 63% of Nigerians living below the poverty line (World Bank 2024 data), the gap between macroeconomic improvements and lived experiences creates political tensions:

Cost of Living: Despite moderating inflation, the cumulative price increases of recent years have devastated household purchasing power. Food prices remain elevated, and essential services like healthcare and education are increasingly unaffordable for many.

Unemployment: Official unemployment statistics understate the crisis. Youth unemployment and underemployment are particularly acute, creating potential for social instability.

Regional Inequalities: Development disparities between regions fuel perceptions of marginalization and inequitable resource distribution, complicating national cohesion efforts.

Election Pressures: The 2027 general elections will inevitably influence economic policy, with pressure for populist measures that may conflict with reform momentum.

External Vulnerabilities

Despite improved reserves and current account projections, Nigeria remains vulnerable to external shocks:

Capital flow volatility: Portfolio inflows are volatile; any global risk-off sentiment can sap liquidity despite CBN support
Commodity price swings: Beyond oil, Nigeria is exposed to prices for food imports and other commodities
Global economic slowdown: Major trading partner recessions would reduce export demand
Debt sustainability: While current debt-to-GDP ratios are manageable, debt service costs consume substantial revenue, limiting fiscal space

Business Sentiment: From Skepticism to Cautious Optimism

Business confidence surveys conducted in late 2025 reveal a meaningful shift in private sector expectations. After years of pessimism, more businesses now anticipate:

Further naira appreciation or stability
Improved operating conditions
Gradual expansion opportunities
Better access to foreign exchange
More predictable policy environment

This psychological shift—from crisis management to growth planning—may prove as consequential as the measurable economic improvements. When businesses begin investing and hiring based on positive expectations, they create self-reinforcing growth dynamics that can sustain expansion beyond the initial policy stimulus.

However, this optimism is conditional and fragile. Businesses remain watchful for policy consistency, security improvements, infrastructure development (especially electricity), and continuation of reform momentum through the political cycle.

Strategic Policy Priorities for Sustained Progress

Immediate Priorities (2026)

1. Electricity Supply Reform and Investment

Nigeria's electricity challenge represents perhaps the single greatest constraint on economic activity. The country of 235 million people has an installed generation capacity of less than 13,000 megawatts—grossly inadequate for industrial development or decent living standards.

Priority actions include:

Complete power infrastructure projects already underway
Finalize electricity sector reforms and privatizations
Support distributed renewable energy deployment (solar, wind)
Reduce distribution losses and improve collections
Enable competitive retail electricity markets

2. Tax Reform Implementation

The success of the tax reforms depends entirely on effective implementation:

Deploy digital infrastructure across all states
Train tax officials and taxpayer service personnel
Conduct comprehensive public awareness campaigns
Establish effective dispute resolution mechanisms
Coordinate federal, state, and local revenue authorities
Monitor compliance and adjust systems based on early results

3. Infrastructure Investment Acceleration

Nigeria's $3 trillion infrastructure gap constrains every aspect of development:

Prioritize roads, rail, and ports for economic connectivity
Invest in water supply and sanitation
Modernize telecommunications infrastructure
Develop special economic zones with world-class infrastructure
Leverage public-private partnerships and development finance

4. Security and Conflict Resolution

Economic development is impossible without security:

Intensify military and police operations against insurgents, bandits, and criminals
Invest in intelligence and surveillance capabilities
Address root causes including poverty, marginalization, and governance failures
Pursue reconciliation and dialogue alongside kinetic operations
Engage communities in security through local policing initiatives

5. Social Protection Enhancement

Cushioning the impact of reforms on vulnerable populations is both morally imperative and politically essential:

Expand conditional cash transfer programs
Subsidize essential healthcare and education for the poor
Implement school feeding programs
Support agricultural inputs for small farmers
Create public works programs for employment generation

Medium-Term Imperatives (2026-2028)

1. Economic Diversification

Develop comprehensive industrial policy supporting manufacturing, agriculture, and services:

Identify sectors with competitive advantage and job creation potential
Invest in enablers: infrastructure, electricity, skills, financial access
Leverage African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) to access regional markets
Support export-oriented industries through targeted incentives
Develop special economic zones and industrial clusters

2. Strengthen Institutions and Governance

Deepen anti-corruption efforts with tangible prosecutions and asset recovery
Improve public financial management and budget execution
Strengthen regulatory quality and reduce bureaucratic obstacles
Enhance transparency and accountability across government
Support independent judiciary and enforcement agencies

3. Invest in Human Capital

Nigeria's greatest asset is its young population—but only if properly educated and healthy:

Reform education to improve quality and relevance
Expand vocational training aligned with labor market needs
Improve healthcare access and quality
Address malnutrition and early childhood development
Support technical education and STEM fields
Expand scholarship programs for tertiary education

4. Build Resilience to Shocks

Develop climate adaptation strategies for agriculture and coastal areas
Diversify export basket beyond oil and primary commodities
Strengthen financial sector stability and consumer protection
Establish sovereign wealth fund mechanisms to manage commodity revenue volatility
Create strategic reserves for essential commodities

Long-Term Vision (Beyond 2028)

Nigeria's ultimate goal should be transforming from a resource-dependent economy to a diversified, industrialized nation providing decent livelihoods for its rapidly growing population. This requires:

Economic Structure: A balanced economy where manufacturing, services, and technology contribute significantly alongside agriculture and extractives, generating quality jobs at scale.

Social Outcomes: Dramatic poverty reduction, expanded middle class, universal access to quality education and healthcare, and significantly reduced inequality.

Governance: Accountable, efficient institutions delivering public services effectively, with strong rule of law and citizen participation in governance.

Regional Integration: Leadership in African economic integration, serving as a manufacturing and services hub for West Africa and beyond.

Global Positioning: Recognition as an upper-middle-income country playing a significant role in global economic and political affairs.

Achieving this vision requires sustained commitment beyond individual administrations or political cycles—a national consensus on development priorities that transcends partisan competition.

Conclusion: Cautious Optimism, Determined Action

As Nigeria navigates 2026, the economic narrative contains grounds for both optimism and concern. The stabilization achieved in 2025—lower inflation, positive growth, improved external position, strengthening naira—demonstrates that sound policies can yield results even in a challenging environment. The comprehensive tax reforms, if implemented effectively, could transform revenue mobilization while providing meaningful relief to ordinary citizens and small businesses.

The data points tell a story of tentative progress:

GDP growth accelerating from 3.98% to projected 4.2–4.5%
Inflation moderating from 18% to 14.45% and projected further to ~13%
External reserves rebuilding from $44.67 billion to $45.6 billion and projected toward $51 billion
Naira stabilizing around ₦1,420–₦1,450/$
Current account shifting from deficit to projected $17.7 billion surplus

Yet stability is not prosperity, and growth statistics mask persistent human suffering. With nearly two-thirds of Nigerians in poverty, millions displaced by conflict, unemployment at crisis levels, and basic services like electricity remaining unreliable, the development challenge remains immense. The gap between macroeconomic indicators and lived experiences creates a fragile political economy where technocratic policy successes may not translate into political support or social stability.

The year ahead will test Nigeria's capacity for:

Disciplined policy implementation through the election cycle and inevitable pressures for populist deviation
Inclusive growth strategies that ensure benefits reach beyond elite circles
Resilience in the face of inevitable oil price volatility, security incidents, and external shocks
Sustained political will to maintain reforms when implementation challenges mount
Social cohesion amid diversity, inequality, and regional tensions

The foundation has been laid. The question now is whether Nigeria's leaders, institutions, and citizens can build upon it to create an economy that works for all its people. The coming months will provide crucial evidence about whether 2026 marks a genuine turning point or merely a temporary respite in a longer struggle for economic transformation.

The stakes could not be higher. With Africa's largest population, massive natural and human resources, and strategic importance to regional stability, Nigeria's success or failure has implications far beyond its borders. The world is watching. More importantly, 235 million Nigerians are hoping—for jobs, security, opportunity, and a better future for their children.

2026 will reveal whether that hope is justified.

Sources and Data References

Primary Data Sources

National Bureau of Statistics (NBS)

GDP Q3 2025 report: https://punchng.com/nigerias-gdp-grows-3-98-as-services-agriculture-strengthen/
CPI November 2025: https://businessday.ng/news/article/nigerias-inflation-ease-to-14-45-in-november/; https://von.gov.ng/nigerias-inflation-rate-falls-to-14-45-in-november-2025-nbs/

Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN)

Inflation time series: https://www.cbn.gov.ng/rates/inflrates.html
2026 Economic Outlook: https://bizwatchnigeria.ng/cbn-forecasts-inflation-to-fall-to-12-94-in-2026-on-cheaper-food-and-fuel-prices/
External reserves projection: https://punchng.com/fx-reserves-to-hit-51bn-by-2026-cbn/
Monetary Policy Committee Communiqués and Statistical Bulletins (2025-2026)

External Reserves Data

TradingEconomics: https://tradingeconomics.com/nigeria/foreign-exchange-reserves
DailyTrust year-end summary: https://dailytrust.com/external-reserves-close-2025-at-45-49bn/
BusinessDay FX inflows: https://businessday.ng/news/article/dollar-inflows-rise-38-in-december-as-cbn-boosts-market-liquidity/

Exchange Rate Data

BusinessDay reports: https://businessday.ng/business-economy/article/naira-records-first-weekly-gain-of-n7-68-in-new-year/
Gistreel daily rates: https://www.gistreel.com/naira-to-dollar-official-black-market-rates-today-january-2-2026/; https://www.gistreel.com/naira-to-dollar-official-black-market-rates-today-friday-january-9-2026/
MarketNewsNG: https://marketnewsng.com/2026/01/07/naira-strengthens-by-7-5-in-2025-hits-n1419-at-official-market/
DailyTimes NG: https://dailytimesng.com/naira-weakens-at-official-window-as-2026-fx-outlook-firms-up/

Budget and Policy Documents

2026 Budget

Presidential budget speech (full text): https://dailypost.ng/2025/12/19/tinubus-2026-budget-speech-full-text/
Senate framework approval: https://punchng.com/senate-lowers-oil-benchmark-approves-n54-46tn-budget/
Budget risks analysis: https://www.icirnigeria.org/nigerias-2026-budget-threatened-as-oil-price-falls-to-60-below-proposed-benchmark/
Federal Ministry of Finance, Budget and National Planning: 2026 Budget Documents and Economic Projections

Tax Reform Documentation

FiscalReforms.ng: Official tax reform documentation and guidance materials

Sector-Specific Analysis

Oil Sector

NUPRC production data: https://businessday.ng/energy/article/nigerias-oil-output-fell-6-to-1-6mbpd-in-november-nuprc/
Production analysis: https://punchng.com/oil-output-averages-1-46mbpd-below-opec-benchmark/
Dangote Refinery operations: https://www.hydrocarbonprocessing.com/news/2026/01/nigerias-dangote-oil-refinery-says-fuel-supply-intact-amid-maintenance/; https://www.naijanews.com/2026/01/05/dangote-refinery-assures-nigerians-of-steady-fuel-output/; https://www.spglobal.com/energy/en/news-research/latest-news/crude-oil/121225-nigerias-dangote-refinery-begins-turnaround-to-stabilize-operations-executive

External Account Projections

CardinalStone analysis: https://www.thetimes.com.ng/2026/01/nigerias-external-account-set-for-17-7-billion-surplus-in-2026-analysts/
CBN current account projections: https://verilynews.com/cbn-projects-nigerias-current-account-surplus-to/
DailyTrust reserves analysis: https://dailytrust.com/analysts-weigh-in-on-51bn-reserve-12-94-inflation-projections/

Institutional Research and Analysis

Research Firms

Norrenberger GDP analysis: https://norrenberger.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Economic-Flash-GDP-Q3-2025.pdf
Meristem macroeconomic update: https://research.meristemng.com/reports/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Macroeconomic-Update-GDP-Report-_-Q3-2025.pdf
PwC Nigeria: "Economic Outlook 2026" (December 2025)
CardinalStone Partners: "2026 Nigeria Macroeconomic Outlook" (December 2025)

International Institutions

International Monetary Fund: "Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa" (October 2025)
Fitch Ratings: "Nigeria Credit Rating and Economic Outlook" (2025)
World Bank: Nigeria Development Update reports

Media Sources

Extensive reporting from Nigerian media outlets including The Guardian, Punch, Vanguard, Premium Times, BusinessDay, ThisDay, Nairametrics, DailyTrust, and others (various articles, 2025-2026).

Data Methodology Note

This analysis synthesizes information from multiple sources to provide comprehensive coverage. Where projections differ across institutions, ranges or multiple estimates are provided. Economic data points have been cross-referenced across sources to ensure accuracy. Exchange rate data reflects market realities across official and parallel markets. All figures are subject to revision as new official data becomes available.

About N-Circular

N-Circular (ncircular.org) provides independent, data-driven analysis of Nigerian economic, political, and social developments. We aggregate news from multiple sources and produce original analytical content to help readers understand the forces shaping Nigeria's future.

Contact: For questions, corrections, or additional information, visit ncircular.org

Disclaimer: This analysis is for informational purposes only and does not constitute financial, investment, or policy advice. Readers should conduct their own research and consult appropriate professionals before making decisions based on this information.

Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0). You may share and adapt this material for non-commercial purposes with appropriate attribution.

Ethiopia’s mega dam has taken 14 years to build: what it means for the Nile’s 11 river states and why it’s so controversial

2025-09-15T10:00:00+00:00

John Mukum Mbaku, Weber State University

In April 2011, Ethiopia began construction of Africa’s largest hydroelectric dam, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), on the Blue Nile river. The dam is expected to generate more than 6,000 megawatts of electricity, effectively transforming Ethiopia into the continent’s largest power exporter.

The dam affects 11 countries, two downstream and nine upstream.

Addis Ababa completed construction of the US$4 billion-plus project in July 2025, mainly with funds sourced from Ethiopians at home and in the diaspora, with an official launch on 9 September 2025. John Mukum Mbaku, who has researched the governance of the Nile’s waters, explains the dam’s potential for Ethiopia – and the controversies that have dogged it.

What are the simmering tensions around the official launch of the dam?

The dispute over the allocation and use of the Nile waters has been going on for many years. This has been exacerbated by climate change, and increased demand for food and water from growing populations.

The 11 countries that share the waters of the Nile have competing development priorities too. These states include Ethiopia, Egypt, Sudan, Rwanda, Tanzania and Kenya.

Egypt and Sudan lie downstream. They receive the river’s waters only after it has passed through the nine upstream states.

Initially, the downstream states, particularly Egypt, opposed the construction of the dam, arguing that it was a threat to their water rights.

However, Ethiopia powered ahead with construction. Egypt and Sudan then shifted negotiations to securing an agreement for filling and operating the dam.

The two downstream states had suggested that filling the dam should take about 12 to 21 years in order to protect their water supply. For domestic and political reasons, Addis Ababa prefered a shorter filling period. In addition, Egypt and Sudan argued that filling the reservoir without a legally binding agreement would disregard their interests and rights.

But with the dam now fully filled and due to be officially inaugurated on 9 September 2025, the issue of a binding agreement for filling the dam’s reservoir is moot.

Egypt and Sudan’s political and diplomatic efforts highlight what they say is the illegality of unilaterally operating the dam without a binding agreement. Despite the intervention of the African Union and the US government, as well as appeals by Egypt to the UN Security Council, the three countries haven’t been able to secure a deal.

Part of the reason is that Egypt has insisted that any negotiations on water allocation begin with the rights granted to it under its 1959 Nile Waters Treaty with Sudan.

Under this agreement, Egypt was granted 66% of the Nile’s estimated average annual water flow of 84 billion cubic metres. Sudan got 22%. The treaty ignores upstream countries’ legal claims to Nile waters, since 10 billion cubic metres were reserved for seepage and evaporation. Ethiopia’s highlands, for instance, supply more than 86% of the water that flows into the Nile River.

Egypt continues to argue that Ethiopia’s dam is a threat to its water security and that, if necessary, it will take measures to protect what it refers to as its “historical rights” to Nile waters.

Egypt relies on the Nile for more than 90% of its fresh water supplies. The country’s water needs have risen as its population has grown and its economy has expanded significantly.

However, Egypt and Sudan’s insistence on keeping their historical water shares cannot be considered equitable and reasonable. Additionally, Cairo doesn’t appear to be prioritising a water-use approach that acknowledges the legal claims of upstream states to the Nile’s waters.

Instead of improving and updating its water infrastructure, minimising wasteful irrigation practices and generally improving water use, Egypt has focused on grandiose mega projects that are putting significant stress on the region’s scarce water resources.

Sudan, which has been battling a devastating civil war since 2023, has raised concerns about Ethiopia’s dam affecting the operations of its own dams. This would make it more difficult to manage Khartoum’s development plans.

What makes agreement on the Nile so elusive?

The legal framework regulating the allocation of the Nile’s waters has been dominated by colonial-era agreements. These have been embraced by the two downstream states, Sudan and Egypt, but contested by the nine upstream ones.

Two of the most important of these agreements are the 1929 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and the 1959 Egypt-Sudan treaty.

The 1959 treaty augmented the water allocations granted to Egypt and Sudan by the 1929 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty. These treaties also granted Egypt veto power over any construction projects on the Nile or its tributaries.

The terms of these treaties, however, are only possible if the nine upstream riparian states don’t access or utilise any water from the Nile and its tributaries.

Most importantly, they make the water rights of the other Nile countries dependent on Egypt and Sudan’s goodwill.

Ethiopia and other upstream states have long argued that they were not parties to the colonial-era treaties and are, therefore, not bound by them.

What international principles guide water use across borders?

The pillars of international transboundary water law are:

(i) equitable and reasonable use

(ii) the obligation not to cause significant harm

(iii) the duty to cooperate.

International legal scholars have noted that the 1959 Nile Treaty stands in sharp contrast to these principles. It disregards the sovereign rights of other riparian countries to their fair share of the Nile, and interferes with their development.

What does the dam promise for Ethiopians?

The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam is a symbol of national unity and pride. It is significant that construction was undertaken without reliance on financing from external actors, such as international financial institutions or major industrial countries.

The dam’s electricity output could potentially transform Ethiopia’s development.

First, the electricity would provide a reliable source of energy for rural industrialisation, reducing deforestation by eliminating the need for households to cut down trees for firewood.

Second, it would reduce the pollution associated with burning wood, dung and other forms of biomass for cooking and other activities.

Third, it would improve access to education, effectively providing light that enhances the ability of pupils to complete homework assignments and study at night. During hot seasons, the electricity generated could be used to cool classrooms, improving learning outcomes.

Finally, higher electricity output would boost internet connectivity in rural areas in Ethiopia, effectively boosting access to the outside world.

The dam could also help with flood control in Sudan and drought protection in Egypt – but only if the three countries work together.

John Mukum Mbaku, Professor, Weber State University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

US-China trade war could hurt Nigerian entrepreneurs: why, and how they should prepare

2025-05-01T10:00:00+00:00

Tolu Olarewaju, Keele University

As China and the United States lock horns in a trade war, slamming tariffs on each other, entrepreneurs in Nigeria are vulnerable to the fallout. In 2024, 27.8% of imports into Nigeria came from China. In the same year, US exports to Nigeria reached US$4.2 billion. Economist and entrepreneurship researcher Tolu Olarewaju unpacks what could happen if Chinese products destined for the American market were diverted to developing economies, including Nigeria.

What dangers do the tariff tensions pose to Nigeria’s entrepreneurs?

China is the world’s biggest manufacturing nation, producing far more than its population consumes domestically. It is already running an almost US$1 trillion goods surplus, meaning it exports more goods than it imports.

China is often producing those goods at below the true cost of production due to domestic subsidies and state financial support, like cheap loans for favoured firms.

If the goods it currently exports are unable to enter the US because tariffs have made them too expensive, Chinese firms could seek to divert them to other countries. This could be beneficial for some consumers. But it could undercut entrepreneurs who make competing products in these countries and threaten jobs and wages.

Looking at the past profile of Chinese exports to Nigeria, these are some Nigerian goods that could be replaced by cheaper goods from China:

Textiles and garments: Nigeria is the largest producer of textiles in west Africa. The Nigerian textile, apparel, and footwear sector contributed 2.97% to Nigeria’s GDP in 2023 and contracted by 1.75% in the first quarter of 2024. Locally made fabrics, garments and leather goods can easily be replaced by Chinese products, especially in the low-cost and mass-market segment. This is because China is one of the sector’s largest producers globally and can export at low cost.

In 2024, the US was the top destination for China’s textiles exports.

Furniture and home décor: Nigerian artisans are skilled at producing wooden furniture, home décor items, and other interior products. However, China is a global leader in furniture manufacturing. It offers mass-produced, inexpensive items. The wide variety and affordability could displace Nigerian furniture makers. The furniture market in Nigeria is expected to generate revenue of US$5.11 billion in 2025 and experience an annual growth rate of 2.93% between 2025 and 2029.

Footwear: The Nigerian footwear market is valued at US$2.57 billion in 2025 and is expected to grow annually by 9.83%. The Nigerian footwear industry produces around 50 million pairs of shoes annually and employs over 500,000 people. China is one of the largest producers of footwear. In the US, 61.9% of all shoes are imported from China. Nigerian shoe manufacturers may find it difficult to compete with the flood of affordable Chinese-made footwear.

Beauty, cosmetic, and skincare products: The Nigerian soap market is growing. It generated revenue of US$660.5 million in 2024 and is expected to reach US$1.07 billion by 2030. With a population of over 200 million, the demand for soap products is increasing. China is a major supplier of inexpensive, mass-produced beauty products.

What are the biggest challenges holding back Nigerian entrepreneurs?

Weak infrastructure: Frequent power outages make it difficult for businesses to operate and distribute their products. This is a significant barrier, especially in the age of digital technologies, machine learning and artificial intelligence. Poor road conditions also make it difficult to transport goods.

High inflation: Nigeria’s headline inflation rate on a year-on-year basis stood at 24.48% in January 2025, and 29.90% in January 2024. High inflation raises the cost of raw materials, fuel, utilities and transport.

Inflation also means a reduction in the purchasing power of consumers. While inflation should make Nigeria a less attractive market, Chinese goods are typically cheaper than local or western alternatives, even when inflation affects import costs.

Interest rates for business loans are high in Nigeria. This reduces profit margins and makes it harder to maintain affordable prices for consumers.

A poor business environment: Nigeria’s unpredictable political and economic landscape, characterised by shifting policies, and inconsistent regulations, makes it difficult for entrepreneurs to plan. They need to be able to forecast expenses, set pricing strategies or invest in long-term projects.

Corruption also increases the costs of doing business and makes the business environment more uncertain.

While it might seem logical for the government to protect the domestic business environment with blanket tariffs as suggested by the Lagos Chamber of Commerce and Industry, a more strategic approach is needed, one that focuses on targeted tariffs and investing in sectors with strong growth potential.

Limited access to finance and high interest rates: Access to finance is a major barrier due to high interest rates and unreasonable collateral requirements for business credit.

Currency depreciation and exchange rate volatility: The Nigerian naira has depreciated against foreign currencies in recent years. Entrepreneurs who rely on imports for raw materials or equipment have been hit hard by fluctuating exchange rates. Rising import costs can lead to even higher production costs. For businesses looking to export, this volatility can reduce the profitability of foreign sales, discouraging expansion into international markets.

What should Nigeria’s entrepreneurs do to prepare for any potential fallout from the China-US trade war?

Identify niche market needs: They should identify a market need that is not being met or that is under-served and cannot easily be met by Chinese goods.

Focus on customer service: This way, entrepreneurs can build customer loyalty and reputation despite the influx of cheap goods.

Embrace innovation: Nigerian entrepreneurs should be open to new ideas and technologies that can help them create new products and services, increase efficiency and reduce costs.

Diversify supply chains: Relying heavily on imports from one country, especially raw materials, machinery, or electronics, can lead to shortages and price hikes if trade tensions escalate. Businesses should identify alternative suppliers, explore local sourcing options, and build stockpiles of essential inputs.

Explore new export markets: Nigerian entrepreneurs should exploit regional trade agreements like the African Continental Free Trade Area for easier access to African markets.

Adaptability and value creation: Businesses that focus on value creation are best positioned not just to survive but to thrive amid global shifts. Raw material exporters (for example, cashew and cocoa) may be vulnerable to price shocks. Value-added products offer better margins and greater market protection. Entrepreneurs should consider investing in light manufacturing or local processing, such as turning cocoa into chocolate.

Tolu Olarewaju, Economist and Lecturer in Management, Keele University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Power vacuum in west Africa’s Sahel: 3 ways China could fill the gap as west exits

2025-03-17T10:00:00+00:00

Abdul-Gafar Tobi Oshodi, Lagos State University

With France fast losing its influence in west Africa’s Sahel region and an unpredictable US president in power, will China fill the vacuum?

The Sahel region covers 10 countries: Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, The Gambia, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal.

French troops have been expelled from three of these – Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger – after military coups. Chad, Senegal and Ivory Coast have also expelled French troops. The troops were there because of the security threat from extremist groups like Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province.

Niger also ended an agreement to keep about 1,000 US troops involved in a counter-terrorism mission. Niger’s military government described the US as having a “condescending attitude”.

While it has been rightly argued that the presence of the western powers did not resolve the security challenges of the region, their withdrawal creates a vacuum.

I am a political science and international relations researcher who has been studying China-Africa relations for over a decade.

I argue that Beijing could take advantage of the vacuum in the Sahel in at least three ways: expansion of investments in critical minerals; resolution of the Ecowas crisis (when Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali exited the regional bloc); and increased arms sales.

This is especially so as China is not new to the Sahel region of west Africa. For instance, China is constructing a US$32 million headquarters for Ecowas in Abuja, Nigeria.

Three ways China could benefit

First, China could expand its influence – and the next four years hold enormous opportunities in this regard.

US president Donald Trump’s likely transactional and unpredictable approach to international relations may force African countries to look to China. For instance, they may need China to help fill the void created by the US decision to dismantle USAID and freeze international development aid.

Nigeria joined Brics as a partner country a few days before the inauguration of Trump. Brics is a group of emerging economies determined to act as a counterweight to the west and to whittle down the influence of global institutions. It was established in 2006 and initially composed of Brazil, Russia, India, and China. This decision by the largest economy in the Sahel is an expression of its commitment to China – with potential implications for other Sahelian countries.

The vacuum offers Beijing the opportunity to strengthen its investment and position as a top beneficiary of the critical minerals, such as gold, copper, lithium and uranium, in the Sahel region.

In 2024, west African gold production was estimated to be 11.83 million ounces. Ghana, Burkina Faso, the Republic of Guinea and Mali were the major contributors.

Second, China is in a unique position to push for a resolution of the Ecowas crisis.

Following military coups, the Ecowas regional economic bloc sanctioned Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. Ecowas even threatened Niger with a military invasion. The three countries then decided to leave Ecowas to form the Alliance of Sahel States.

As a neutral actor whose non-interference policy accommodates both civil and military regimes, Beijing is in a position to bring Ecowas and the Alliance of Sahel States into negotiation before the final departure date of 29 July 2025.

If it succeeds, China would look more like a peaceful power, an image that is contested by others.

Building on its soft power projects like the Confucius Institutes and scholarships, China would look like the “saviour” of Ecowas integration.

This is what it did in the case of the Tazara railway project, where China supported Tanzania and Zambia to build a railway line together. It supported the African countries when the US and Europe had failed, were reluctant or were not interested.

Third is Chinese arms sales.

Chinese arms are already in the Sahel. In 2019, Nigeria signed a US$152 million contract with the China North Industries Corporation Limited (Norinco) to provide some of the weapons needed to fight the Boko Haram terror group. Since then, Chinese drones and other equipment have become a feature in Nigeria’s counter-terrorism response.

The Chinese arms market could receive a major boost beyond Nigeria with the withdrawal of western countries from the Sahel. Western countries are likely to be reluctant to sell arms to the countries that have evicted their military.

Sanctions on Russia have also increased the likelihood of Chinese arms in the Sahel.

For example, a few months after France and the US left the region, some reports suggested that Russian mercenaries in the Sahel region were using Chinese weapons. Norinco – China’s top arms manufacturer and seventh largest arms supplier in the world – has opened sales offices in Nigeria and Senegal.

In June 2024, Burkina Faso received 100 tanks from China. Three months after, Mali signed an agreement with Norinco to bolster its fight against terrorism.

Bumpy road ahead

China’s non-interference can accommodate both civil and military governments in the Sahel. This is an advantage for Beijing in some ways. But it could also have unexpected impacts.

There are competing local interests in the Sahel and Beijing’s deepening involvement could be (mis)interpreted as supporting one over the other.

This could make Chinese interests a target in the violence.

It is also unclear if China is capable or willing to fill the vacuum created by the evicted western powers. But it looks as though China can benefit from the situation in the Sahel in the short term.

Abdul-Gafar Tobi Oshodi, Faculty member, Department of Political Science, Lagos State University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Africa in 2024: A Year of Transformation, Challenges, and Resilience

2024-12-10T10:00:00+00:00

As 2024 comes to a close, the African continent continues to showcase its dynamism, resilience, and challenges. From significant political events to economic shifts, here is an in-depth look at the most notable happenings across Africa this year.

1. Political Landscape: Shaping Democracy and Governance

A Year of Elections

2024 was a pivotal year for democracy in Africa, with over a dozen countries holding elections. Notable among them:

South Africa: For the first time since the end of apartheid, the African National Congress (ANC) lost its parliamentary majority, leading to the formation of a coalition government. This shift signaled a potential new era of governance for the country.
Algeria: Presidential elections saw incumbent Abdelmadjid Tebboune secure another term amidst criticisms of a tightly controlled electoral process and limited media freedom.
Malawi and Zambia: Both nations held peaceful general elections that reinforced their commitment to democratic norms.

Military Coups and Political Instability

The wave of military coups since 2020 continued to ripple through Africa. Gabon and Niger witnessed significant power shifts, with military juntas asserting control. These coups raised questions about governance stability and prompted calls for the African Union to address this recurring issue.

2. Economic Highlights: Growth Amidst Challenges

Economic Growth

Despite global economic uncertainties, Africa remained the second fastest-growing economic region in 2024, with a projected growth rate of 4%. East Africa led this charge due to strategic infrastructure investments and favorable policies.

Debt and Financial Resilience

Several countries, including Ghana and Zambia, faced financial crises, leading to debt restructuring agreements. Efforts like the Pan-African Payment and Settlement System emerged as solutions to reduce dependence on external currencies and foster intra-African trade.

Strategic Minerals and Global Interest

The race for Africa’s critical minerals intensified, with countries like the Democratic Republic of Congo and Zambia renegotiating mining contracts to secure better deals. The operationalization of Angola’s Lobito Corridor further boosted mineral export capacities.

3. Environmental and Climatic Events

Devastating Natural Disasters

South Africa experienced severe tornadoes and storms in KwaZulu-Natal, displacing thousands and causing significant damage.
Climate change continued to exacerbate food insecurity across the Sahel region, with droughts and unpredictable weather patterns affecting millions.

Conservation Milestones

In a major achievement, several African heritage sites were added to UNESCO’s list, including South Africa’s Sharpeville Massacre site and prehistoric landmarks in KwaZulu-Natal.

4. Social and Cultural Developments

Advancing Human Rights

South Africa marked a historic moment with the appointment of Mandisa Maya as the first female Chief Justice.
Efforts to combat human trafficking gained traction, as seen in the rescue of Ethiopian migrants in Johannesburg.

Celebrating Achievements

Africa shone at the 2024 Summer Olympics, with standout performances from athletes like Tatjana Schoenmaker, who won gold for South Africa.
Innovations in technology and the arts continued to emerge, highlighting Africa’s rich creative potential.

5. Conflict and Peacekeeping Efforts

Ongoing Conflicts

The Great Lakes region faced escalating tensions, particularly in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Regional efforts, spearheaded by Rwanda and neighboring states, sought to address insurgencies and stabilize the area.

Africa’s Role in Global Peacekeeping

Rwanda maintained its status as a leading contributor to United Nations peacekeeping missions, playing a critical role in conflict zones such as Mozambique and the Central African Republic.

6. Looking Ahead: Challenges and Opportunities

As Africa moves into 2025, the continent faces a mix of opportunities and hurdles. From tackling debt and climate change to bolstering democratic institutions, the coming years will be crucial in shaping the future of Africa.

Key Priorities for 2025:

Strengthening governance and democratic systems.
Advancing regional integration to boost trade and economic resilience.
Addressing climate change impacts through innovative solutions.

Conclusion

Africa in 2024 has been a story of resilience, transformation, and hope. As the continent navigates complex challenges, its rich diversity and unwavering spirit continue to inspire the world.

Sources:

Chatham House: What’s at Stake for Africa in 2024
African Center for Strategic Studies: Africa’s 2024 Elections: Challenges and Opportunities
Wikipedia: 2024 in South Africa

Death of a liberation movement: how South Africa’s ANC became just a regular political party – with some help from Jacob Zuma

2024-07-01T10:00:00+00:00

By http://www.anc.org.za/sites/default/files/docs/lge-manifestou.pdf, Fair use, Link

Roger Southall, University of the Witwatersrand

The African National Congress (ANC), the party that’s led South Africa since the first democratic elections in 1994, has long considered itself a “liberation movement” – representing all South Africans, as the “voice of the people”.

But its dismal performance in the 2024 elections (winning only 40% of the national vote) confirms that its transition from the status of a liberation movement to just a political party is now complete. There can no longer be a pretence that it alone represents “the people”. It is now simply the largest among a host of ordinary political parties doing what ordinary political parties do: scrambling for votes, political power and influence.

I have studied the ANC since the days of the liberation struggle and as a party in power.

In reality, any notion of the ANC embodying the people has been creaking for years. Those at odds with its leadership have peeled away to found new political parties. First there was Bantu Holomisa, who fell out with Nelson Mandela in 1996. More recently, in 2012, Julius Malema was expelled after supposedly bringing the ANC into disrepute. Malema founded the Economic Freedom Fighters to fight the election in 2014.

Only the Economic Freedom Fighters was to gain much political traction. But the message was clear: the coalition on which the ANC was based was becoming ever more fragile and could not last.

Hence the historical significance of the electoral eruption of the uMkhonto we Sizwe Party (MK Party) of Jacob Zuma, former president of both the ANC and South Africa. Prior to the 2024 election, Zuma’s party was widely recognised as representing a threat to ANC hegemony, both nationally and provincially in KwaZulu-Natal. But the strength of its performance has taken South Africa (and the party itself) aback.

Within six months, and with only the rudiments of organisation stolen from the ANC itself, it has taken 14.5% of the national votes and 45% of the KwaZulu-Natal votes in its first election.

Few can dispute that its rise is the most dramatic stage in the dissolution of the coalition which gave the ANC a claim to being a liberation movement.

The making of a liberation movement

The ANC’s claim goes back to its foundation in 1912. It was a reaction to the formation of the Union of South Africa by white politicians and their exclusion of the majority black people from the right to vote or participate on equal terms with whites.

At its creation, the ANC (or the South African Native National Congress, as it was known until 1923) was the coming together of South Africa’s black and Coloured population (in the old terminology): its diverse ethnic peoples, their chiefly representatives and the emerging African professionals and black middle class.

This culminated decades later in its leadership of the Congress Alliance, the bringing together of the ANC with the South African Indian Congress, the Coloured People’s Congress and the (largely white) Congress of Democrats.

The ANC’s predominance among those fighting apartheid was to be briefly challenged by the breakaway of the Africanists grouped together as the Pan-Africanist Congress in 1959. But the threat dissipated during the long years of exile as the Pan-Africanist Congress collapsed into factionalism.

By the early 1990s, via its alliance with the South African Communist Party, and under the leadership of Nelson Mandela, the ANC could put forth a highly plausible claim to be the genuine representative of “the people”. By this it meant the overwhelming majority of South Africans, of diverse colours and backgrounds, who were bound together by a commitment to “non-racialism” and who were oppressed by apartheid. This was confirmed by the ANC’s performance in the 1994 election: 63% of the vote.

It could say that the non-racial and democratic South Africa which had emerged from the negotiation process with the apartheid regime was essentially the product of its own vision and imagination.

If any movement could lay claim to having “liberated” South Africa, it was the ANC. However, while aspiring to unity, the ANC was never a monolith. Indeed, it was precisely because it was always a coalescence of diverse tendencies, notably of communists and non-communists, and of “Africanists” and those committed to “non-racialism”, that so much importance was attached to the notion of its being a “liberation movement”.

A political party was seen as just that: a grouping which represented just a “part” of the people. In contrast, the ANC was presented and viewed itself as embodying the essence of the people, the soul of the nation, and as capable of reconciling differences which might otherwise blow a historically and racially divided nation apart. It followed that those who opposed it were divisive.

In other words, there was always a tension at the heart of the ANC’s notion of democracy. It was always a difficult balancing act. At one moment, it celebrated the diversity and plurality which found its form in a new constitution which was largely based on the tenets of liberal democracy. At another, it insisted on the unity of the nation under its own leadership, which was distinctly illiberal, even totalitarian.

Liberal democracy presumed that the ANC’s leadership of the nation could be displaced at an election. But the alternative notion of democracy suggested that it could not. If the ANC was “the people”, how could “the people” overthrow the ANC?

The ANC has lost ground, but the tradition lives on

At its height, reached in the 2004 election, the ANC swept just under 69.7% of the total vote. With Holomisa’s United Democratic Movement winning 2.3%, the total vote for parties representing the historical tradition of the ANC amounted to 71%.

In the 2013 election, the total vote for the ANC tradition, made up of the ANC (62.15%), Economic Freedom Fighters (6.35%) and United Democratic Movement (1%), amounted to 69.5%. In 2019, the combined vote for the ANC (57.5%) and Economic Freedom Fighters (10.8%) remained much the same, at 68.3%. So it remains in 2024, with the combined vote for the ANC (40.18%), Economic Freedom Fighters (9.52%) and uMkhonto we Sizwe (14.59%) coming in at 64.3%.

In short, the ANC tradition remains dominant, but the ANC as a liberation movement does not.

Herein lies much of the significance of the 2024 election. It is the ANC that has lost ground, not the ANC tradition. What has become divided could reunite. Or more likely, bits of it could reunite.

The faultline

A commitment to the form and values of the constitution is becoming the major fault-line in South Africa’s politics, opening the potential for an alliance between uMkhonto we Sizwe, Economic Freedom Fighters and the remnants of the “radical economic transformation” faction within the ANC.

The more that looms, the greater the possibilities for a coming together of the constitutional element within the ANC, a progressive bloc within the main opposition Democratic Alliance, and other parties, the old (Inkatha Freedom Party) and the new, such as Rise Mzansi, which are committed to the values of 1994.

Never has the future of South Africa’s politics been more uncertain, but the one certainty that holds is that the ANC’s standing as a liberation movement is dead. In effect, there are now two ANCs: the ANC of current leader Cyril Ramaphosa, and the ANC of Jacob Zuma and Julius Malema. They cannot both claim to represent “the people”.

Roger Southall, Professor of Sociology, University of the Witwatersrand

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

US-Africa trade deal turns 25 next year: Agoa’s winners, losers and what should come next

2024-05-13T10:00:00+00:00

Bedassa Tadesse, University of Minnesota Duluth

The African Growth and Opportunity Act (Agoa) is a landmark piece of trade legislation enacted by the United States in 2000. Its goal is to promote economic growth, development and poverty reduction in sub-Saharan Africa by providing qualifying countries with duty-free access to the US market for over 6,500 products. By eliminating import tariffs and quotas, Agoa aims to stimulate trade, attract foreign investment and foster economic integration between the US and African nations.

Agoa has made strides in boosting exports from eligible African countries to the US. Between 2001 and 2021, the annual value of US imports from Agoa-eligible countries nearly tripled, from US$8.15 billion to US$21.8 billion. The trade preferences have particularly benefited sectors like apparel, textiles, agriculture and light manufacturing. However, Agoa’s impact has been uneven across the region. Some countries have used the opportunities more effectively than others.

As Agoa approaches its 25th anniversary next year, policymakers are considering extending it for a further 16 years. I recently conducted a comprehensive review of scholarly articles and policy reports that analyse the impact of Agoa on the economic performance of sub-Saharan Africa. Below are the four key observations.

1. Some countries have benefited more than others

Agoa’s benefits can’t be measured in just one metric. They reflect in various terms for various countries. But available research indicates that the countries that benefited most from Agoa include South Africa, Kenya, Lesotho, Mauritius, Madagascar, Ethiopia and Ghana.

These nations have used Agoa preferences to substantially increase their exports to the US, particularly in sectors like apparel, textiles and light manufacturing.

Kenya, where apparel-dominated exports to the US have grown from US$55 million in 2001 to US$603 million in 2022, is a shining example of growth in exports. Mauritius exported chocolate and basket-weaving materials. Mali exported buckwheat, travel goods and musical instruments until its 2022 suspension. Mozambique exported sugar, nuts and tobacco. Togo exported wheat, legumes and fruit juices.

Lesotho’s success story is equally inspiring. It has had rapid export growth and job creation in its apparel sector, and this has contributed to new manufacturing jobs.

These success stories underscore the potential of Agoa to drive economic growth and job creation.

2. Some countries have not benefited much

Central and west African countries have not extensively used Agoa’s benefits. They have been held back by weakness in infrastructure, governance and global market integration.

Burundi, the Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, The Gambia, Guinea-Bissau and Mali have seen little export growth and foreign direct investment, or no benefits.

3. Reason for the uneven benefits

The variation in Agoa’s impact across sub-Saharan Africa is down to several factors. First, countries with better infrastructure, stable governance and conducive business environments are better positioned to attract foreign investment and increase exports.

Second, the level of economic diversification and export capabilities matters. Countries with more diversified export baskets and established manufacturing sectors have managed to make the most of Agoa’s opportunities.

Third, national policies and strategies to complement Agoa are essential. Countries that put in place policies to improve productivity, integrate value chains and ease supply-side constraints appear to have had success under Agoa. Cultural (historical) connections with the US market may have also provided an advantage for some countries, like Kenya and Lesotho.

4. What the future holds

The US Senate is considering extending Agoa for another 16 years. It is vital to consider the lessons learned from the past 25 years.

Diversify the economy and add value: Many countries still rely heavily on primary commodity exports. This leaves them vulnerable to global price movements and limits their economic development prospects.

Invest in infrastructure: Transport, energy and communication are critical to enhance competitiveness and attract more foreign direct investment. Public-private partnerships and multilateral development financing could help to fill infrastructure gaps.

Promote good governance, political stability and institutional reforms: These create an enabling environment for businesses and investors. It means strengthening legal frameworks, combating corruption and ensuring the rule of law.

Build capacity and develop skills: It should be a priority to enhance human capital and create a skilled workforce that can support the other steps outlined above.

Recognise the diverse economic, political and social contexts in sub-Saharan Africa: Tailored strategies and targeted assistance could work better for individual countries.

As Agoa approaches its 25th anniversary, the potential extension through 2041 presents a strategic opportunity. The sub-Saharan African countries should refine and broaden Agoa’s impact to better serve the diverse needs of the region. By tackling the uneven impacts and focusing on sustainable development goals, Agoa can continue to play a part in the region’s economic transformation. The US and beneficiary countries must work together closely to ensure the benefits are widespread and inclusive.

Bedassa Tadesse, Professor of Economics, University of Minnesota Duluth

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Scramble for the Sahel – why France, Russia, China and the United States are interested in the region

2024-01-08T10:00:00+00:00

Olayinka Ajala, Leeds Beckett University

The Sahel, a region 3,860km wide located south of the Sahara Desert and stretching east-west across the African continent, has been a focus of attention around the world recently.

In the last decade, issues such as terrorism, insecurity and trafficking have characterised the region.

Military takeovers have been a major source of concern in the region and beyond in the last few years. Since 2020, the region has had four successful coup d’états and three failed ones.

The coup in Niger particularly attracted attention. This is because Niger was seen as a “darling of the west” and a model for democratic governance in the region.

Despite the challenges facing the region, the scramble for the Sahel remains intense.

The main actors in this scramble are the European Union, France, Russia, China and the United States.

The EU relies on Sahelian countries, especially Niger, to stop mass illegal immigration into the bloc. Niger is a major transit country in the region. Niger had security and defence partnerships with the EU until recently when the country unilaterally cancelled the deals. This is a source of concern to the EU.

Why are these foreign powers interested in the Sahel?

As a scholar in international relations and having researched the region for over a decade, I see the main reasons as follows:

availability of natural resources
strategic location of the region in Africa
economic interests of the countries involved in the scramble
defence and security cooperation in the form of arms sales.

Foreign powers all have their reasons to be involved in the scramble for the Sahel.

France

Most of the countries in the Sahel region were colonised by France. Unlike Britain, France has maintained strong links with former colonies. They cooperate in the economy, defence and resource extraction, to mention a few areas.

France has the first right to buy any natural resources discovered in all its former colonies. Although the relationship between France and its former colonies appeared cordial, recent coups in Francophone countries and anti-France sentiments across Africa have revealed the opposite.

The coups have been followed by large demonstrations against France and in support of the putschists.

Despite these cracks, France is keen to maintain its grip on these countries, especially pertaining to military cooperation and resource extraction. France was reluctant to pull its military out of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger despite the countries severing military partnerships. It continues to extract natural resources in these countries.

Russia

The relationships between Russia and many Sahelian countries were established during the cold war and colonial era. More recently, the emphasis by western countries on human rights, especially during counterterrorism operations, has pushed Sahelian countries closer to Russia.

While western allies demand the rule of law, democracy, and human rights in return for security and economic support, Russia portrays itself differently. The invasion of Ukraine by Russia in 2022 also increased Russia’s interest in the Sahel because it is keen to maintain allies in Africa.

Russia has openly backed military regimes in Mali and Burkina Faso and warned against any military intervention in Niger when the military took power. Furthermore, the Wagner group, the controversial private military company which is controlled by Russia, cooperates with some countries in the Sahel. Niger has cancelled defence agreement with the EU and switched to Russia. All of these factors explain Russia’s interest in the Sahel.

China

Like Russia, China portrays itself as an alternative to the traditional ally (France) of Sahelian countries. With a mantra of “non-interference” and “respecting sovereignty”, China has entrenched itself as a “partner” of countries in the Sahel.

The Sahel region is rich in natural resources such as oil, uranium, natural gas and lithium. Chinese state-owned enterprises operate in Niger, Chad, Mali and Burkina Faso.

For instance, Mali potentially has one of the largest lithium reserves in the world and China’s Ganfeng Lithium has invested heavily in the country. In addition, despite China’s development in military hardware, most of the weapons are untested. China is keen to use the conflicts in the Sahel to test its arms products.

The United States

In 2019, the US opened its largest drone base in Africa in Agadez-Niger. A year before that, I had written about the security implications of the base for the region.

Unlike France and China, which both have extensive economic interests in the Sahel, the US has a strong military interest. Niger, in particular, is strategically located and the US can easily fly surveillance and reconnaissance drones from the country to cover the Sahel, west and central Africa.

As France is being militarily dislodged by its former colonies in the region, the US has been trying to fill the void to prevent Russia and China from establishing further military presence.

The US took several months to label the military takeover in Niger a coup so as not to lose strategic military cooperation and dominance.

The year 2023 has been particularly challenging for the countries in the Sahel. With issues ranging from economic instability to insecurity, the region remains fragile. Despite the instability and fragility, the scramble for the region remains intense with traditional allies such as France losing its grip and other powers stepping up.

The Sahel is one to keep an eye on in 2024 and beyond.

Olayinka Ajala, Senior lecturer in Politics and International Relations, Leeds Beckett University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Israel-Palestine conflict divides South African politicians – what their responses reveal about historical alliances

2023-10-16T10:00:00+00:00

Asher Lubotzky, University of Houston

Hamas’ brazen and deadly attack on Israel on October 7 elicited varied responses within the South African political scene. These diverse reactions reflect the long history, since before democracy in 1994, of South African engagement with the Israel-Palestinian conflict. The conflict holds symbolic significance for many in the country.

As with the war in Ukraine, taking sides on the issue also allows the different parties to highlight their position on the struggle for or against global western dominance

The South African government, led by the African National Congress (ANC), characterised the recent events as a “devastating escalation”. However, it primarily attributed the situation to Israeli policies, including “the continued illegal occupation of Palestine land, continued settlement expansion, desecration of the Al Aqsa Mosque and Christian holy sites, and ongoing oppression of the Palestinian people”.

It called for

the immediate cessation of violence, restraint, and peace between Israel and Palestine.

It also urged Israel to embrace the two-state solution as a means of resolving the conflict. The two-state solution suggests the creation of an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel.

For its part, the ANC put out its own statement in the name of the party. This gave even bolder support for Hamas. The party’s national spokesperson, Mahlengi Bhengu-Motsiri, defended Hamas’ actions, invoking the enduring solidarity between the ANC and the Palestinian cause.

It can no longer be disputed that South Africa’s apartheid history is occupied Palestine’s reality… the decision by Palestinians to respond to the brutality of the settler Israeli apartheid regime is unsurprising.

The Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), a far-left pan-Africanist party which was formed after a split from the ANC, and is now the third largest party in parliament, endorsed Hamas’ use of violence. Drawing parallels with the anti-apartheid struggle, the party’s spokesperson squarely placed the blame on Israel.

Conversely, several movements offered their solidarity with Israel. The liberal Democratic Alliance, the main opposition party, vehemently condemned the “unprovoked attack” by Hamas. It decried the

senseless violence and all acts of terror against innocent civilians, women and children.

Some centrist or traditionalist parties, such as the Patriotic Alliance and the Inkatha Freedom Party, also voiced their criticism of the attacks. South Africa’s principal Jewish organisations also extended their support for Israel.

Historical roots

Unwavering support for Palestinian nationhood has remained a steadfast element of South African foreign policy since the ANC came into power in 1994. This stance has seen the country become one of the most prominent voices critical of Israel globally.

The ANC has thrown its support behind the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions, a movement aiming to replicate the iconic anti-apartheid boycott campaign. South African officials have consistently accused Israel of practising apartheid. The country’s parliament recently voted to formally downgrade the country’s relations with Israel from embassy to a liaison office.

I have been researching the history of the relationship between South Africa and Israel for nearly a decade. My research has found that both the ANC and some pan-Africanist formations once held more complex perspectives on Israel and Zionism.

They generally expressed support for Jewish statehood from the 1940s to the 1960s. For instance, in the early 1960s, both the ANC and its primary rival in the anti-apartheid struggle, the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), considered Israel as a potential ally in their battle against apartheid. The PAC also received substantial financial assistance from Israel until 1970.

However, the ANC’s resentment towards Israel for its collaboration with white minority rule during the 1970s and 1980s, coupled with the perception of Palestinians suffering an apartheid-like oppression, has come to shape the party’s perspective on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Since the late 1960s, the ANC has cultivated strong ties with the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO). By the 1980s, these ties had evolved into a strategic and operational alliance between the two movements. In recent years, with the weakening of the PLO, the ANC has shifted its support towards the PLO’s erstwhile rival, Hamas. The Muslim constituency in South Africa, many of whom are ANC supporters and activists, further contributes to the party’s pro-Palestinian stance.

The DA’s support of Israel also has historical roots. Historically, liberal or so-called “moderate” parties and individuals in South Africa have been the most consistent pro-Israeli political voice in the country.

Unlike the post-1970s ANC, many liberals have regarded Israel as a democracy with a decent record in treating minorities. In the Western Cape, which is the only province governed by the DA, there has been a greater willingness to explore collaboration with Israel.

In addition, in recent decades, various Christian and traditionalist forces have also strongly tended towards pro-Israeli views.

South Africa last asked people for their religious affiliation in a household survey in 2013. The figures at the time showed there were just over 1 million Muslims and just over 101,500 people of the Jewish faith. More recent data indicates that the Jewish population in the country was dropped to about 50,000 people. The latest census puts the entire population at 62 million.

Long legacy of international alliances

The diverse perspectives of South Africa’s political parties on Israel/Palestine also mirror their distinct international allegiances. Having valued the assistance of the Soviet Union and China in their struggle against apartheid, and nurturing deep-seated grievances against the western role in supporting apartheid, the ANC and more radical movements have tended to stand beside actors that challenge the US on the global stage.

This policy has been particularly evident in South Africa’s sympathetic stance towards Russia, even amid Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine. Conversely, the opposition DA has aligned itself with pro-western stances.

However, it’s uncertain whether most South Africans support the ANC’s approach to contemporary foreign relations issues. A poll from November 2022 found that 74.3% of citizens condemned Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.

It is likely that the Palestinian cause enjoys higher levels of popular support. But, there are indications that views on Israel/Palestine are far from clear-cut. A study from 2017, for instance, found that there was similar support in South Africa for both Israelis’ and Palestinians’ “rights to a homeland” (54% and 53%, respectively). But the study also concluded that actual knowledge of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was limited, with only 29% having “heard of” the conflict.

South Africa’s official stance on Israel-Palestine is one of the most critical in Africa, particularly compared to other states south of the Sahara. Over the past decade, Israel has seen increasing bilateral relations with various African states. Several opinion polls indicate that public perception of Israel in sub-Saharan Africa is among the most favourable worldwide.

Lingering divide

South African politicians have framed the recent escalation between Hamas and Israel within the broader context of their perspectives on global dynamics. As with the war in Ukraine, the governing ANC and more radical elements unequivocally support the Palestinians – their longstanding allies. They view Hamas as representing the Palestinian cause, and perceive Israel as an apartheid state.

The liberal DA’s support for Israel is also shaped by historical and contemporary factors. It mirrors the enduring liberal backing of Israel in South Africa. It also allows the party to align itself with western governments that have recently expressed support for Israel.

Asher Lubotzky, Scholar in Residence, University of Houston

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Civilian support for military coups is rising in parts of Africa: why the reasons matter

2023-09-04T10:00:00+00:00

The clamour for coups among citizens is rising. Wikimedia Commons

Carlos García Rivero, Universitat de València

On the night of 13 January 1963, Togo’s President Sylvanus Olympio was shot dead by rebels in the first military coup staged in Africa. A long list, as shown below, was to come. From the 1960s to the end of the millennium, there were an average of four military coups a year on the continent. By the end of the 1990s this phenomenon seemed to have faded away.

But since August 2020 six African nations have suffered seven coups or attempted coups.

First came Mali, in August 2020. The military took advantage of social unrest and insecurity caused by the activities of violent extremists. Mali had two coups or attempts in a nine-month span.

In April 2021, Chad followed the same path. In March 2021, there was a coup attempt in Niger, and in September 2021 it was Guinea’s turn. A month later, it was Sudan. In Burkina Faso, an attack in November 2021 led to the coup in January 2022.

More recently, a coup was launched in Niger, deposing President Mohamed Bazoum. Two days later, General Abdourahamane Tchiani declared himself the leader of Niger.

All together, that’s more than 100 million people being ruled by the military after power was seized violently. All are in the Sahel. This has alerted governments in the region.

Researchers, analysts and journalists have pointed to mismanagement, incompetence, corruption, economic crisis and state weakness as the main factors propelling military coups all over the world and, of course, in Africa. State weakness is a factor in the recent instances in Africa. They have happened partly because of governments’ failure to stem the spread of groups linked to Al Qaeda and the Islamic State all over the Sahel.

But there are two intertwined characteristics that differentiate Africa from the rest of the world. One is the public support of many citizens on the streets when there is a coup. The other is the society’s rising support for military rule as a form of government. Popular support for military rule has grown in the last 20 years.

My research explored the reasons for this. I used survey data to examine whether support for nondemocratic rule was mainly due to poor institutional and economic performance or to an existing so-called authoritarian personality and culture in the region. This type of personality refers to values existing in certain societies that make them more prone to embrace authoritarian forms of government.

This distinction is relevant because if the reason for military rule support is cultural, then societies will continue to endorse authoritarian regimes. If the reason is institutional performance, then as long as incumbent governments perform efficiently, both politically and economically, democratic support will overcome authoritarian support.

Citizen discontent

I carried out a quantitative analysis using Afrobarometer survey data gathered from 37 African countries, both from North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa. The analysis looked for underlying factors propelling the rise in support for military rule.

Respondents were asked about the extent of their support for military rule as a form of government plus a number of other potential explanatory questions such as perception of corruption, governing and opposition parties performance, economy evaluation and socio-demographic issues like their level of education.

The data shows that from 2000 to the present, the level of support for military rule as a form of government has doubled, from 11.6% of people supporting “much” or “very much” military rule as a form of government to 22.3%. Of the 37 countries analysed, there were 11 where support for military dictatorship was decreasing and 26 where this figure was on the rise. The latest Afrobarometer data shows that support for democracy has fallen in the last year. Out of 38 countries, only four show decreasing support for military rule since 2000, whereas 34 show higher support for higher military rule than in 2000.

Support for military rule was higher in “partly free” and “not free” countries than in “free” countries. (They were categorised according to the Freedom House index.)

But there were some exceptions. In South Africa, which is a constitutional democracy with regular elections, one in three South Africans supported military rule as a form of government. In democratic Namibia the level of support showed that one in four Namibians supported military rule.

Reasons to support military rule

The analysis points to three conclusions:

In sub-Saharan Africa, the legitimacy of military rule is mainly based on institutional performance and economic management. These are weakened by jihadist organisations rapidly expanding throughout the region. State institutions are not able to tackle their expansion throughout the region.
In North Africa, institutional performance plays a role but authoritarian personality plays a larger role in the support for military rule.
Education seems to be an antidote against authoritarianism. Those with higher level of education, according to survey data, show higher level of democratic endorsement.

The study’s findings suggest that people in sub-Saharan Africa are fed up with their governments for many reasons, including security threats, humanitarian disasters and lack of prospects. Waiting for the next elections to take place to change government does not seem to them to be a good option. Opposition parties do not seem to enjoy a better image. For the survey respondents, the solution appears to be to welcome the military to intervene.

If citizens perceive that politicians don’t care about them, this will invite the military to continue overthrowing civil governments, with society publicly legitimising their intervention in politics.

If military, political and economic solutions are not found, military coups in the region will increase and people will continue gathering on the streets to welcome them. Niger’s recent coup may not be the last one.

Carlos García Rivero, Associate Professor, Universitat de València

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Nigeria’s food insecurity: declaring a state of emergency isn’t a real solution - here’s what is

2023-07-31T10:00:00+00:00

In 2022, government launched one million rice paddies, stacked in 15 pyramids, but the country’s food crisis has persisted. Kola Sulaimon/AFP via Getty Images

Stephen Onyeiwu, Allegheny College

Nigerians doing their grocery shopping in July 2023 are paying 25% more for staple items than they did a year ago.

Nigeria’s inflation rate stands at about 22.79%, but the prices of staple food items like eggs, bread, evaporated milk, palm oil and plantain have risen by over 25% within the past year.

Using the Nigerian Bureau of Statistics monthly data on food prices, I estimate that a moderate-income family of four, consuming staple foods like egg, milk, bread, rice, beans, garri, beef, catfish, plantains and vegetable oil, spent about 64,000 naira (US$80) on food in May 2022.

By May of 2023, this family would have spent about 80,000 naira ($100), a 25% increase. Data compiled by the World Economic Forum show that the average Nigerian household spends about 56% of its income on food. That’s the highest in the world.

Three other African countries that spend a high percentage of income on food are Kenya (46.7%), Cameroon (45.6%) and Algeria (42.5%). In contrast, the US, UK, Canada and Australia spend 6.4%, 8.2%, 9.1% and 9.8%, respectively.

This big bite out of household income means that food price increases have a severe impact on Nigerians. An estimated 25 million people are facing hunger.

Nigeria’s situation is so dire that President Bola Tinubu has declared a state of emergency on food insecurity.

But will it work? My view as an economist is that fixing Nigeria’s food inflation goes beyond declaring a state of emergency. It requires a bold and well articulated strategy to transform agriculture and rural life.

Why emergency declaration is not enough

Parts of Tinubu’s emergency plan have been tried in the past. For example:

putting the National Security Council in charge of matters relating to food security and water availability
providing fertiliser and grain to farmers and households
creating synergies between the ministries of agriculture and water resources
establishing a National Commodity Board to stabilise food prices through food reserves and land banks.

Land banks are unused properties acquired and managed by the government. The goal is to use them for agricultural production, housing and other socially beneficial projects. Nigeria has an estimated 500,000 hectares of land banks.

But they won’t be useful to increase food production if the country’s young people aren’t interested in making a living through agriculture.

Most of the measures proposed by the president are short- to medium-term plans. They aren’t long-lasting solutions for the country’s food crisis.

Learnings from India

Nigeria could learn some lessons from other developing countries. One is India, which in the 1950s and 1960s experienced food shortages so severe that it became known as a “begging-bowl” nation.

By making food self-sufficiency its top economic and foreign policy priority in the 1960s, India jettisoned that image and became a major exporter of food.

India’s self-sufficiency in food production is the result of the Green Revolution initiated by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in the early 1960s.

Programmes under the Green Revolution included pro-agriculture economic policies, land reform and investment in rural infrastructure and agricultural technology.

Land reform: Land reform gave rural people access to agricultural land, supported by government-provided irrigation systems, rainwater catchments and extension officers.

A ceiling of 25 acres (10 hectares) was placed on land ownership per household. Absentee landowners with surplus land were forced to give up some land for redistribution.

Commercial agriculture is often suggested as the panacea for Nigeria’s food crisis. But India’s agriculture is dominated by small and medium farmers. These farmers value their farms more than their houses.

The lesson for Nigeria is simple: agricultural development is not just about giving farmers subsidised fertiliser and low-interest credit. It is also about institutional reform.

Transport network: Perhaps the greatest boost to food production in India was the inexpensive and extensive transport network in the country. Villages are connected to markets by paved roads and rail. State-owned buses are everywhere, even in the most isolated regions of the country.

Transport fares have been kept very low by competition from the ubiquitous “autos” (or three-wheelers) and rickshaws. Farmers can bring their products to the market daily.

Improved productivity: Rising agricultural productivity has benefited farmers and non-agricultural workers alike. Farmers’ incomes have been on the rise, while food prices have been kept low for workers in other sectors.

Higher rural incomes have spurred demand for manufactured goods. Factories have come to rural communities, generating employment.

The industrial and agricultural sectors complement each other. Indian farmers supply an abundance of inputs such as coffee beans, tea leaves, fruit, vegetables and leather products to the country’s agro-processing firms, including global corporations.

No quick fixes

There are no quick and easy fixes for Nigeria’s food crisis. India started its journey to food self-sufficiency in the 1960s, and it took a long time before its agricultural development strategy began to pay off.

The way to solve the food crisis in Nigeria is through sound economic policies that make agriculture attractive (particularly to the youth), as well as institutional reforms that protect land tenure, raise farmers’ productivity, boost supply, and lower prices to consumers, while also ensuring good returns for agricultural investment.

It is doubtful that the mere declaration of a national emergency, with a long wish-list, will succeed in ensuring food security in Nigeria.

Stephen Onyeiwu, Professor of Economics & Business, Allegheny College

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Nigeria’s new foreign exchange policy is good news - but it can’t work wonders for the economy on its own

2023-06-22T10:00:00+00:00

A man exchanges Nigeria’s Naira for US dollars in Lagos in April 2021. Pius Utomi Ekpei/AFP via Getty Images

Stephen Onyeiwu, Allegheny College

The Central Bank of Nigeria recently announced changes to the way the country’s foreign exchange market will work. Foreign currencies can now be bought and sold at rates determined by the market – not by the central bank.

This signals the intention of the Bola Ahmed Tinubu administration to allow market forces to determine the value of the naira.

In the past, there were multiple exchange rates for the currency. The International Monetary Fund has repeatedly called on Nigeria to end this. The huge gap between the official and unofficial rates caused severe shortages of foreign exchange by discouraging supply.

In general, the existence of multiple exchange rates signals a dysfunctional economy. It erodes investor confidence. Capital does not flow in and foreign exchange becomes scarcer.

This is not the first time Nigeria will be liberalising the foreign exchange market. The first was in 1986; further efforts followed in 1995, 1999 and 2016. All were marred by various impediments.

The three key problems that afflict Nigeria’s foreign exchange market are the lack of transparency, foreign exchange shortages and volatility.

Shortages occur mainly because about 90% of Nigeria’s foreign exchange earnings come from the oil sector. The market is volatile when oil prices drop with no corresponding fall in demand.

To make matters worse, much of the foreign exchange from non-oil sources (such as diaspora remittances, tourism and export of non-oil products) is channelled through the black market.

Other African countries that grappled with shortages and volatility have also liberalised the market. Egypt floated its currency in 2016 and the value of the Egyptian pound declined by 50%. South Africa also has a free-float policy, but that has not prevented the rand from fluctuating.

One lesson for Nigeria is that the stability of the naira depends partly on the country’s monetary and fiscal policies, as well as political stability, security and investor confidence in the economy. It also depends on whether the Central Bank of Nigeria will follow through with this new policy. Previous efforts were abandoned prematurely.

As an economist, I have observed the various reactions of Nigerians to this policy. It’s too soon to decipher the full consequences, but it is possible to highlight some of what can be expected.

I believe that the new policy could have several positive results. It should reduce Nigeria’s bloated parallel market for foreign exchange, discourage rent-seeking, foster a stable macroeconomic environment, attract foreign investment, boost exports, stabilise the exchange rate and prevent the dollarisation of the economy. These would all improve the investment climate and spur economic growth.

Deflating a bloated parallel market

Nigeria’s black market for foreign exchange is not like any other in the world. It handles most of the foreign exchange transactions in the country.

Allowing market forces to determine the exchange rate will eventually bring the parallel and official rates together.

Evidence of this will be a decrease in the huge number of black market currency dealers at airports, hotels and major streets.

But some black market activity will remain, not least for money laundering and other illicit financial transactions.

From rent-seeking to productive investment

The large spread between the parallel and official rates has fuelled rent-seeking behaviours in Nigeria. There are people whose main preoccupation is to mop up foreign exchange at the official rate and then flip the currency at the black market rate.

This perverse practice has become part of Nigeria’s widespread crony capitalism, whereby a few privileged individuals and companies obtain foreign currency from the central bank at low rates.

If the new policy is put into practice effectively, these speculators will have to engage in more productive activities.

Macroeconomic stability and economic growth

The new policy will foster exchange rate stability and predictability. Previously, it was unclear how the central bank determined the exchange rate. This prompted speculative buying and selling.

With the new policy, the value of the naira will be determined by market fundamentals. It will discourage the hoarding of foreign currencies. This may also increase supply, which will stabilise the exchange rate.

This is good for the economy. What matters for economic growth and development is not the exchange rate itself but whether it is likely to change rapidly.

Attraction of foreign and portfolio investment

The volatility that comes with multiple exchange rates and speculation makes it difficult for individuals, businesses and investors to plan. It becomes very challenging to forecast the return on investment.

People then “wait and see” before doing business or sending remittances. This causes a fall in the supply of foreign exchange.

Speculators hoard foreign currencies (depleting supply), while those awash with naira mop up whatever foreign currencies they can find – increasing demand. The result is an upward spiral in the exchange rate.

The new policy will encourage capital inflow into the country. Foreign investors will reinvest more of their earnings in the country. Nigerians in the diaspora will deposit more money in their Nigerian bank accounts without fear of losing value.

Export growth and long-term exchange rate stability

The new policy will help prevent over-valuation of the naira. This will ultimately make Nigerian goods cheaper in the international market and increase the flow of foreign exchange through exports. The naira’s value will stabilise.

Importers, however, would be negatively affected by a fall in the value of the naira, which would raise the cost of imported raw materials.

With the removal of the fuel subsidy, manufacturers and retailers may have to raise their prices to remain profitable. It is therefore reasonable to expect Nigeria’s inflation rate to increase as a result of the new policy. This will be a short-term effect, as a more stable exchange rate will boost the economy’s productive capacity in the long run, and subsequently curb inflation.

A decrease in the pressure for dollarisation

The new foreign exchange policy will reduce the pressure to use US dollars. Businesses in Nigeria have tended to demand payment in hard currencies.

The US dollar has been used as a “store of value” because of inflation and the fall in the naira’s value.

Preference for hard currencies will lessen if the new policy stabilises the exchange rate.

Conclusion

In the final analysis, what determines the stability and effectiveness of a country’s exchange rate policy is the state of the economy and the quality of the country’s economic policies.

People should not expect the new exchange rate policy to work wonders. The naira will become more stable only when the country attracts investors and tourists, diversifies the economy and exports more non-oil products.

Stephen Onyeiwu, Professor of Economics & Business, Allegheny College

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Sudan’s conflict will have a ripple effect in an unstable region - and across the world

2023-05-10T10:00:00+00:00

The raging conflict in Khartoum could negatively affect trade flows through Port Sudan to the rest of the world. Getty Images

John Mukum Mbaku, Weber State University

Sudan, Africa’s third largest country by land mass, shares borders with seven countries in an unstable region. This means that Sudan’s current conflict will have economic, social and political ripple effects across a number of countries, including the Central African Republic, Egypt, Libya, Chad, South Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea.

The conflict might also affect countries further afield, including the US, Russia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia, which have close economic ties with Sudan. It could destabilise the Sahel region and the Horn of Africa and jeopardise US interests in these regions. It could also delay the ratification, by the yet-to-be-formed legislative assembly, of the agreement for Russia to build a naval base at Port Sudan. Finally, the conflict could interfere with trade between Sudan and the Gulf states – the UAE and Saudi Arabia.

Sudan’s top exports are gold, which earned a total of US$2.85 billion in 2021, groundnuts (US$488 million), crude oil (US$385 million), and sheep and goats (US$239 million), all of which are sold primarily to the UAE, China, Saudi Arabia, India and Italy.

Sudan (and South Sudan) exported about 132,000 barrels per day of crude oil in 2021 with the UAE accounting for 45% of these exports. Sudan is also the world’s top exporter of gum arabic, a key ingredient for many food industries. The harvest of this product has been disrupted by the conflict.

Sudan’s main imports are raw sugar, refined petroleum, wheat, packaged medicines and cars, mainly from China, UAE, Saudi Arabia, India and Egypt. The current conflict could derail this trade and create economic problems for Sudan and its trading partners.

Sudan is not a major export market for these countries but they should care about the instability in Khartoum for at least two reasons. First, the conflict could destabilise the region and negatively affect the efforts of these countries to expand their export trade. Second, Sudan is located on the Red Sea. Instability could interfere with trade flows through the Suez Canal, restraining these countries’ ability to trade with the rest of the world.

Port Sudan, which is about 169 nautical miles from Jeddah (Saudi Arabia), is an important travel point for thousands of Muslims from west and other parts of Africa who are embarking on the Hajj to Mecca through Jeddah Islamic Port. In addition, most Nigerian hajj air carriers transit through Sudanese airspace on their way to Mecca. Violent conflict in Sudan could force these carriers to seek alternative but more expensive and longer routes, a process that could prevent many Muslims from successfully performing this important religious ritual.

In addition, 90% of Sudan’s external trade passes through Port Sudan. The port is also an important commercial sea gateway for neighbouring landlocked countries. Interruption of the port could worsen already acute shortages of key commodities, including especially food.

Port Sudan also has a container port that handles trade to and from various parts of the world. It has been argued that Russia is seeking to build a military base at Port Sudan in order to grant its warships access to and influence over one of the world’s busiest and most contested sea lanes – the Suez Canal.

Ripple effect

A civil war in Sudan could spill into already violence-plagued neighbouring countries, such as Chad, the Central African Republic, South Sudan, Libya, Eritrea and Ethiopia.

Were Sudan’s neighbours to get involved on either side of the conflict, the region could become embroiled in the civil war largely because communities in the border areas share a common heritage.

Two countries stand to suffer the most if the conflict escalates: Egypt and South Sudan.

Sudan straddles the Nile River. Its main tributaries meet at Khartoum and then flow downstream to water-hungry Egypt. Fragility in Khartoum could affect Egypt’s fresh water supply and hence economic and social development.

Instability in Khartoum could also derail efforts to reach agreement on the filling and management of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. That could create problems, not just for Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia, but also for the entire Nile basin.

The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam is a hydro-electric project which Cairo sees as a threat to its use of the Nile. Since Ethiopia began constructing the dam in 2011, Egypt has relied on Khartoum’s cooperation to fight perceived threats to its water security.

Cairo might see Sudan’s security situation as a threat to reaching a mutually acceptable tripartite treaty for the filling and management of the dam. A peaceful, democratic Sudan, thus, is important to Egypt and other Nile Basin countries.

Ninety percent of South Sudan’s economy is based on oil, which is exported through Sudan to Port Sudan. Conflict in Khartoum could seriously interfere with oil shipments and force economic collapse in South Sudan.

External ties

Outside the African continent, three countries have significant interests in seeing Sudan return to peaceful coexistence: the Russian Federation, the US and the UAE.

The Russian Federation: Russia is interested primarily in gaining access to the country’s enormous resources, which include gold, uranium, oil and its port facilities. Looking ahead, Russia also has much to lose. It has sought for some time to establish a military base at Port Sudan, which would host about 300 troops and give Russian warships access to and influence over the Suez Canal and the Red Sea.

Russia’s hope is that its foothold in Sudan will give it better access to other countries in North Africa and the Horn of Africa. A full-blown civil war would delay or derail that.

The United States: Some foreign governments, such as the US, have indicated that they are interested in helping Sudan establish democratic institutions and a governing process undergirded by the rule of law. Others may want to place themselves in a position to exploit the country and its resources. However, since it signed on to the Abraham Accords, Sudan has emerged as an important player in efforts by Washington to improve diplomatic relations between Israel and the Arab States.

The United Arab Emirates (UAE): The UAE has military and commercial assets in Eritrea, Somaliland, Somalia and the southern coast of Yemen. It stands to benefit from a peaceful Sudan. Under the administration of Omar al-Bashir – the military leader who ruled Sudan for three decades until he was overthrown during a 2019 popular uprising – Sudan was a beneficiary of billions of dollars in aid from the UAE. The UAE has also benefited from the relationship. For example, Sudan has become a major exporter of gold to the UAE.

Finally, continued instability in Sudan could exacerbate the already serious humanitarian situation in many of Sudan’s neighbours, such as Chad, which has received hundreds of thousands of Sudanese refugees.

John Mukum Mbaku, Professor, Weber State University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Closing Thoughts on the Nigerian Presidential Elections

2023-04-03T10:00:00+00:00

The 2023 Nigerian presidential election was held on February 25, 2023. The incumbent president, Muhammadu Buhari, was not on the ballot, as he had served the constitutionally permitted two terms in office.

The two main candidates were Bola Tinubu of the All Progressives Congress (APC) and Atiku Abubakar of the People's Democratic Party (PDP). Tinubu, a former governor of Lagos State, polled 36.61% of the vote, while Abubakar, a former vice president, polled 29.07%.

Peter Obi of the Labour Party came in third place with 25.41% of the vote.

The election was marred by allegations of voter fraud and violence. The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) has rejected the allegations of fraud, but some opposition parties have called for the results to be annulled.

The election has been seen as a test of Nigeria's democracy. The country has a history of violence and instability, but the 2023 election was largely peaceful.

The outcome of the election is likely to have a significant impact on Nigeria's economy and politics. Tinubu has promised to improve the economy and create jobs, while Abubakar has promised to fight corruption and improve security.

The election has also been seen as a referendum on Buhari's presidency. Buhari has been criticized for his handling of the economy and security, but he remains popular among many Nigerians.

The 2023 Nigerian presidential election was a historic moment for the country. The election was largely peaceful and the outcome is likely to have a significant impact on Nigeria's future.

Here are some of the key takeaways from the election:

The APC remains the dominant party in Nigeria, winning the presidential election and controlling the majority of state governorships.
The PDP remains a strong opposition party, but it failed to win the presidency or control a majority of state governorships.
The Labour Party emerged as a significant force in Nigerian politics, winning 18% of the presidential vote and controlling two state governorships.
The election was largely peaceful, but there were some reports of violence and intimidation.
The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) was praised for its handling of the election, but some opposition parties raised concerns about voter fraud.
The outcome of the election is likely to have a significant impact on Nigeria's economy and politics. The APC has promised to improve the economy and create jobs, while the PDP has promised to fight corruption and improve security.

Nigeria had 93 million registered voters, but only a quarter voted: 5 reasons why

2023-03-23T10:00:00+00:00

Nigeria’s voter turnout has been declining since 2007. Samuel Alabi/AFP via Getty Images

Chikodiri Nwangwu, Ph.D, University of Nigeria

Nigerians went to the polls in late February to vote for a new president, as well as representatives to two houses of the federal parliament. The turnout was abysmal. There were over 93 million registered voters. But only a little over 25 million people voted. The Conversation Africa asked political scientist Chikodiri Nwangwu to unpack what happened.

Why was Nigeria’s voter turnout so low?

Firstly, there was insufficient voter education. Many Nigerians don’t understand the benefits of political participation, or don’t understand the electoral process. Little effort is made to explain it to them.

Although voter education is the statutory responsibility of both the electoral commission and political parties, their commitment to this task has been rather underwhelming. Many adult Nigerians – especially in remote areas where media access and literacy levels are low – lack adequate appreciation of the voting process. They also don’t know enough about political parties’ ideologies and internal workings.

Secondly, there were logistical challenges for the electoral body. Voting material was delivered late, even on election day.

Some voters got discouraged and left their polling centres because of the late arrival of materials.

Thirdly, there was a lack of confidence in the electoral commission’s capacity to conduct credible elections. This point was noted in the European Union election observer report after the election. The report says:

On election night, trust in the institution was seen to diminish due to information gaps and INEC’s failure to promptly respond to stakeholder disquiet over logistical and security lapses and later the failure of public access to presidential results on the IReV.

IReV is the online portal where polling unit-level results are uploaded directly from the polling unit, transmitted and made available for public monitoring. INEC is the country’s electoral agency, the Independent National Electoral Commission.

Fourthly, voters might have stayed away because they were scared. Nigeria has a long history of violence during elections.

Fifth is the issue of apathy. The failure to turn up could be read as a vote of no confidence in the Nigerian state. The government’s recurrent failure to arrest the country’s growing social problems, like the cash crisis and petrol scarcity, are reasons for voter apathy.

How low was the turnout compared to previous years?

Voter turnout refers to the percentage of people who actually take part in an election relative to the total number of registered voters. More broadly, it compares the total number of people of voting age in a country and those who cast their ballot during a particular election. A little over 25 million voters, about 28.63% of the registered voters, turned out for the 25 February 2023 elections. Over 93 million voters were registered to vote in the elections.

Data from the election management body shows that Nigeria’s voter turnout has been declining almost every year since 2007.

Voter turnout went up from 52.3% in 1999 – the first general election since 1993 – to 69% in 2003. But it’s been on the decline nearly ever since – 57.5% in 2007, 53.7% in 2011, 43.7% in 2015 and 34.8% in 2019. This year’s is 28.63%.

Increasing voter registration has failed to translate into more voters turning out.

Bola Ahmed Tinubu of the ruling All Progressives Congress was declared winner with fewer than 9 million votes. This is 36.61% of the votes cast to govern a country with a population of 220 million people.

What can be done to turn the tide?

The Independent National Electoral Commission and political parties should be more committed to educating the voting public on the importance of participating in politics.

Competent logistics companies should be used in the delivery of sensitive voting materials instead of an approach that has proved to incubate electoral disenfranchisement and voter apathy.

Relevant security agencies should be more proactive and intelligence-driven in quelling political thuggery and electoral violence.

Further, the electoral commission should deal firmly with politicians who aid political violence in Nigeria. Above all, the government should be unmistakably committed to delivering democratic goods to regain public trust and confidence in electoral processes.

Lastly, there should be a proper audit of the voter register. This has never happened, and in my view the register is largely inaccurate. The increasing use of voter accreditation technology since 2015 has shown that figures for previous voter turnouts are inaccurate. The new technology has thrown up attempts at fraud and the manipulation of registration processes.

Given the lack of an audit, it would not be surprising if the current register contained names of those who have died and other ineligible voters.

Chikodiri Nwangwu, Ph.D, Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science, University of Nigeria

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

100 years of pop music in Nigeria: what shaped four eras

2023-01-02T10:00:00+00:00

Nigerian musician Fela Kuti and his band in Harlem, New York, 1989. Jack Vartoogian/Getty Images

Chijioke Ngobili, University of Nigeria

The global outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in the early months of 2020 shut down nearly all physical and social human activities. For musical practice this meant near death. Performing music is, after all, one of the oldest forms of social human engagement.

In Nigeria, the shutdown of concerts and public music performances was swift. Not even the Nigerian–Biafran War of 1967 to 1970 could shut down all of Nigeria. In fact, popular music activities boomed in Lagos as bombs rained on Biafra.

The pandemic was a watershed moment and offers a compelling reason to trace the trajectory and evolution of popular music in Nigeria 100 years ago since the birth of the modern state.

In a study I surveyed the various political, economic and social events, trends and choices that characterised the 98 years between 1922 and 2020, giving consideration to how they shaped popular music practices and experiences in and of Nigeria.

Nigeria became a modern state in 1914 when British colonial powers amalgamated the northern and southern protectorates into one unit. A music recording in London in 1922 by Rev Josiah Ransome-Kuti (grandfather of music icon Fela Kuti) is regarded as the first formal effort at commercialising and “popularising” Nigerian music.

From that beginning, four periods emerged from the study: I called them the foggy years, the interactive-budding period, the liberal period and the mononationalist period.

1922–1944: juju and palm-wine music

For the first 22 years there was a foggy or unclear direction in the emergence of popular music practices in urban Nigeria. In this short time, two world wars and internal economic and sociopolitical tensions interfered with and delayed the growth of popular music. They limited social life among the youth, calling young men to enrol into the West African Frontier Force that fought for Britain.

These years witnessed early recordings by musician Domingo Justus and political activist Ladipo Solanke. The early recorded music was sung in the style of a hymn in a Yoruba church, accompanied by plucked string instruments like the banjo.

The arrival of the guitar was followed by the rise of the Jùjú music style in Lagos. Jùjú was basically a modern Yoruba-language reinterpretation of its traditional, precolonial Àsìkò music with the principal instrument known as jùjú (the tambourine). It was led by such artists as Tunde King, whose song Aronke Macaulay was produced in 1937.

Palm-wine music emerged, expressing a combination of styles but mostly accompanied by guitars and banjos and performed at palm wine drinking bars in the emerging urban areas. It was championed by Israel Nwaoba, G.T. Ọnwụka and others. Also notable is the appearance of the Ọnịcha Native Orchestra, which combined only musical instruments of the Igbo people while exploring various social themes and trends in their native singing style.

The church, the guitar and the tavern all influenced early popular music in Nigeria.

1945–1969: highlife and civil war

The next 24 years saw interaction and budding among Nigerians as a new sociopolitical order emerged from the ashes of the Second World War. A wave of decolonisation and talk of independence spread throughout colonial Africa. There was increased participation of Nigerians in mainstream social and political affairs.

With this a new generation of musicians emerged who would – through extensive interactions across nations and personalities – forge a decolonised popular music culture. They moved from the colonial influences they had been subjected to from birth.

It was at this time that Nigerian highlife music and the highlife music of Ghana and other nations evolved. It spread along the West African coast, essentially from increased cultural interactions between Africa and the West. “High” was in the name because highlife was reserved for “highly” placed Africans resident in urban centres.

It mostly adopted simple Western tonality, chords and instruments (like guitars, brass horns and bands) to perform popular themes (like love, mourning and joy), either in local languages, pidgin or English. The marching bands of the colonial military formations were a major influence in the emergence of highlife. A few of the early notable exponents were Bobby Benson, Victor Olaiya, Stephen Amaechi, Samuel Akpabot and Rex Lawson.

During this period, female artists joined the popular music industry for the first time, among them Foyeke Ajangila and Comfort Omoge. And while US-influenced jazz and twist styles were introduced in Nigeria, Jùjú was also being championed.

The Nigerian–Biafran War brought the era to an end by 1969.

1970–1999: Afrobeat and oil

The liberal period marked the most diverse and expansive moment of popular music practices in Nigeria so far. After the war, regional popular music styles and practices came to the fore. And new influences came with imports of foreign popular music such as pop (Michael Jackson), rock (Beatles), marabi (Miriam Makeba) and others.

As influences mixed, new Afro-based music genres rose. Most celebrated of these was Afrobeat (Fela Kuti). Afrobeat is a fusion of rich African polyrhythms and Afro-American forms like jazz and reggae. It was influenced by local political struggles and the US civil rights movement.

But there was also Afro-reggae (Sonny Okosun), Afro-jùjú (Shina Peters) and Afro-pop (Dora Ifudu). There was increased participation of women in the industry (Onyeka Onwenu, Salawa Abeni and others).

Middle class income grew as a result of the first oil boom in Nigeria. Added to this was the rise of pentecostal Christianity among young people as well as the rise of sophisticated Lagos nightclubs. The likes of Ron Ekundayo and Benson Idonije would foreground the explosion of Nigerian deejays from the 2000s. In this period popular music styles were often adapted to gospel themes.

2000–2022: Naija hip hop and Afrobeats

With the start of a new century came a seismic shift from a diverse to a singular focus in Nigerian popular music. The new government of Olusegun Obasanjo decided to pursue a local content policy. This meant that local music was foregrounded in media and broadcast. This would help form the “Naija hip hop” scene.

Naija hip hop is a profusion of US/global hip hop, Afrobeat, highlife and other Nigerian/African styles mediated through computer-aided technology. It boasts local rhythms, languages and dance styles. A remarkable feature of the Naija hip hop movement is its branching out into Afrobeats – an interlinked fusion of various Afro-based genres that has given Nigeria the greatest global fame and acceptance since its emergence as a modern nation-state in 1914.

Just a few of the notable artists of this period include Plantashun Boiz, Lagbaja, 2Face Idibia/2Baba, Flavour, Aṣa, Davido, Wizkid, Tems and Burna Boy.

I characterise this period as mononationalist because of the one-dimensional focus on a particular nationalist musical movement (Naija hip hop) that has dominated.

Today

The global COVID-19 pandemic’s shutdown of public life boosted online music structures and opportunities while helping to contain the unchecked powers of music pirates. This allowed many more talented and younger artists to emerge independently. But COVID-19 brought heavy economic losses to artists and music industry workers.

In 2022, the Naija hip hop phenomenon, whose child is Afrobeats, is surging on with hit songs tearing competitively into the global soundscape. As Nigeria marks a century of popular music practices and experiences, it appears that the mononationalist era may last for a full generation (three decades) or more before another episode emerges.

Chijioke Ngobili, Lecturer in Music, University of Nigeria

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

The Promise and Peril of Nigeria’s 2023 Elections

2022-12-27T10:00:00+00:00

Michelle Gavin, The Council on Foreign Relations

Nigeria’s 2023 general election is just weeks away. With incumbent President Mohammadu Buhari term-limited, the country will be choosing a new leader. That new president will immediately confront an exhausting array of challenges, from multiple, complex security crises to a disastrously mismanaged economy. In a recent Afrobarometer survey, nearly 89 percent of Nigerians felt that the country was heading in the wrong direction, and 77 percent were dissatisfied with the way their democracy has been performing.

There are some reasons for optimism that the upcoming polls will be an improvement on the 2019 election. First, President Buhari has strongly signaled that he wants a credible, transparent electoral process to be an important part of his legacy. Legal reforms enabled earlier planning and new technology has been deployed to improve voter accreditation and the transmission of results. A surge of new voter registrations, especially among young people, suggests that Nigerians believe the 2023 elections are a process worth their time and energy.

But political violence continues to bedevil the country. Among its most worrisome manifestations are the attacks on offices of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), which clearly aim to undermine the electoral process itself. History has primed observers to be concerned about post-election violence. But the prospects of disarray due to attacks on election infrastructure, or of significant numbers of Nigerian voters determining that it simply is not safe to vote on election day, are also scenarios that call for urgent attention. Choosing Nigerian leadership is up to Nigerian voters, but external actors, including the United States, should continue to make it clear that anyone weaponizing fear to undermine democracy could be subject to targeted sanctions.

Moreover, elections alone don’t translate to accountable, democratic governance. The rule of law, applied to all citizens, is equally essential. But impunity has thus far rendered new laws around campaign financing and transparency moot. That same impunity led to zero accountability for the 2020 Lekki toll gate killings, and for years has enabled the theft of resources that could have been used to serve the Nigerian people. No matter how well the election goes, any newly elected government will have to address this massive challenge to create the kind of democracy that can deliver real results for Nigerians.

All this matters to the rest of the world. The stakes are high, not just for Nigerians, but more broadly for the region, where military coups and democratic backsliding have undermined regional governance norms. Nigeria has been internally focused for over a decade, unable and unwilling to wield the kind of decisive regional influence that it did years ago. But Nigeria is inescapably important to the future of the continent. The sheer size of its economy and population, alongside the power and reach of its cultural and creative industries, mean that even with a desultory foreign policy, Nigeria’s trajectory will affect societies far beyond its borders.

This article was originally published on The Council on Foreign Relations. Read the original article.

As the 8 billionth person is born, here’s how Africa will shape the future of the planet’s population

2022-11-15T10:00:00+00:00

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Akanni Ibukun Akinyemi, Obafemi Awolowo University; Esther William Dungumaro, University of Dar es Salaam, and Jacques Emina, University of Kinshasa

In mid-November 2022 the eight billionth person will be born, according to the United Nations. In its analysis of this milestone, the UN makes two key observations. The first is that the global population has been expanding at its slowest rate since 1950. The growth rate dropped below 1% in 2020, a trend that is likely to continue. The second is that the growth in population has been due to the gradual increase in human lifespan owing to improvements in public health, nutrition, personal hygiene and medicine. It’s also the result of high and persistent levels of fertility in some countries. According to the UN, just eight countries are expected to be behind 50% of the population growth over the next 30 years. Five are in Africa: the Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Nigeria and Tanzania. Demographers Akanni Akinyemi, Jacques Emina and Esther Dungumaro unpack these dynamics.

What’s the significance of the eight billionth birth?

It raises concerns – scientists estimate that Earth’s maximum carrying capacity is between nine billion and 10 billion people.

Appreciating these numbers requires an understanding of the distribution and demographic structure of the population. Where are these people across regions, countries, and rural and urban geographies?

There is a potential upside to growing populations. It’s known as a demographic dividend. Population growth can be a blessing, spurring economic growth from shifts in a population’s age structure. This is a prospect if working-age people have good health, quality education, decent employment and a lower proportion of young dependants.

But realising this dividend depends on a host of things. They include the structure of the population by age, level of education and skills, and living conditions, as well as the distribution of available resources.

The consequences of population growth are socioeconomic, political and environmental. Some of them can be negative. How these unfold is determined by the characteristics of the population and its distribution.

Why are birth rates so high in five African countries?

The major factors driving population growth in these countries include low contraceptive use, high adolescent fertility rates and a prevalence of polygamous marriages. There’s also the low education status of women, low to poor investment in children’s education, and factors related to religion and ideas.

The use of modern contraceptives is generally low across sub-Saharan Africa. The overall prevalence is 22%. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, however, the uptake of short-acting contraceptives is at 8.1%. In Nigeria, it is at 10.5%. The uptake in Ethiopia is 25%, in Tanzania it’s 27.1% and in Egypt 43%.

For long-acting family planning methods, apart from Egypt with over 20% uptake, the other four countries driving population growth in the region recorded very poor uptake. This low uptake will logically lead to a population explosion.

Some of the factors associated with high contraceptive use in Africa are women’s education, exposure to news and mass media, good economic status and urban residency.

The adolescent fertility rate in sub-Saharan Africa – while showing a downward trend – is still relatively high. The adolescent fertility rate captures the number of births per 1,000 girls aged 15 to 19. In sub-Saharan Africa, it stands at an average of 98 births per 1,000 girls.

There is a wide variation in this rate across the five countries: from 52 in Egypt and 62 in Ethiopia to 102 in Nigeria, 114 in Tanzania and 119 in the DRC.

Outside the continent, the adolescent fertility rate is 21 in Asia and the Pacific, and 26 in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. In the US, it’s at 15, five in France and 42 globally.

The adolescent fertility rate has huge implications for population growth because of the number of years between the start of childbearing and the end of a woman’s reproductive age. A high fertility rate in this age group also has a negative influence on the health, economic and educational potential of women and their children.

Another factor driving population growth in these five African countries is polygamous marriage. Women in polygamous unions living in rural areas with low socio-economic status are likely to have higher fertility rates than women in other areas.

Polygamy is illegal in the DRC. Nevertheless, it’s common. About 36% of married women in Nigeria, one-quarter of married women in rural Tanzania and 11% of those in Ethiopia are in polygamous marriages.

Finally, a woman’s education status has a significant impact on fertility. For instance, in Tanzania, women with no formal education have as many as 3.3 more children than women with secondary or tertiary education.

Are rising populations a cause for major concern in these countries?

Yes.

One of the biggest concerns is the scale of these countries’ development.

The World Bank classifies the DRC among the five poorest nations in the world, with nearly 64% of the population living on less than US$2.15 a day. One in six of sub-Saharan Africa’s poorest people is found in the DRC.

In Nigeria, about 40% of the population lives below the poverty line. The west African nation also faces issues of insecurity, poor infrastructure and high unemployment.

Steady population growth in these five countries will exert further stress on already inadequate infrastructure and services.

Also, the age structure of the populations of these five countries reflects high levels of dependency. The population of young people who aren’t in the labour force and that of older people is far higher than of those in their prime ages (18 to 64) who are gainfully employed.

There is also a potential shortage of working-age people with high skills compared with the population of those who depend on them for survival in these five countries.

This is because these countries have a very youthful population. The median age ranges from 17 in the DRC to 17.7 in Tanzania and 18.8 in Nigeria. There is also the prospect of many young people living in unfavourable socioeconomic realities and poverty.

In most countries, population growth is the slowest since 1950. Why?

Most countries, particularly in America, Asia, Europe, Oceania and North Africa, have completed the fertility transition. In other words, they are experiencing below-replacement fertility levels – fewer than two children are being born per woman.

The main drivers of low fertility include the increased use of modern contraceptives, increased age at first marriage and higher numbers of educated women.

What should the next steps be for African countries with high fertility rates?

Government policies and programmes need to take into account population growth and align interventions with sustainable use and access to resources.

Governments at regional, national and sub-national levels also need to invest in infrastructure and education. They need to create employment if they are to benefit from a growing population. There is also need to continue investing in family planning.

The age structure of the population is also of concern. The expected growth in population numbers is likely to increase the concentration of young people and those of prime ages. With limited socio-economic opportunities for young people, countries are more likely to be subject to the forces of international migration.

The proportion of older people is also likely to increase in the five countries in focus. This increases the need for investment in social security, infrastructure and innovative support for older people. Unfortunately, issues around older people have not gained prominence on the continent.

Akanni Ibukun Akinyemi, Professor, Obafemi Awolowo University; Esther William Dungumaro, Associate Professor of Demography, University of Dar es Salaam, and Jacques Emina, Professor of population and development studies, University of Kinshasa

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.